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SCHOOL CHOICE1 THROUGH VOUCHERS:
DRAWING CONSTITUTIONAL LEMON-AID
FROM THE LEMON TEST
"If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on
America the mediocre educational performance that exists to-
day, we might well have viewed it as an act of war."




Rarely a day goes by without news coverage focusing on the
poor condition of our nation's public school system.3 Americans
1 The phrase "school choice" applies to many different types of program propos-
als designed to provide parents with the opportunity to select the school of their
choice for their children. See PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 14-16 (1994). For purposes of
this Note, the terms "school choice," "school choice/voucher," and "fully participating
school voucher" programs are defined as follows:
School Choice Program - plans which permit students to cross district lines
to attend schools. Parental choice is typically limited to public schools.
School Choice/Voucher Program - plans which permit students to cross
district lines to attend schools. Parental choice is limited to public and pri-
vate non-sectarian schools. A system of certificates (vouchers) or cash
payments are made by the state to the selected school. The value of the
payment is based on a fixed percentage of the local per-pupil cost of public
education.
Fully Participating School Voucher Program - plans which permit students
to cross district lines to attend schools. Parental choice is unlimited, allow-
ing for selection of public, private non-sectarian, or private sectarian
schools. This program utilizes the same system of funding as school
choice/voucher plans.
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RisK:
THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983). President Ronald Reagan
called for the establishment of a commission to review American public education.
See 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 592 (May 2, 1983) (transcribing president's re-
marks after receiving commission's final report). Former Education Secretary Terrel
H. Bell established the eighteen member National Commission on Excellence in
Education in 1981. Government Panel Finds Decline in U.S. Education; Urges Ac-
tion to Upgrade Schools, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Apr. 29, 1983, at 310
Al. The commission issued the report after twenty months of research. Id.3 See, e.g., Charter Schools - New Model For Public Schools Provides Opportuni-
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have been inundated with startling statistics which illustrate the
inefficiencies of many public school systems across the country.4
ties and Challenges, GAO REPORTS, Jan. 19, 1995 (report-number: GAO/HEHS-95-
42 Jan. 18) (developing model charter school program to alleviate variety of con-
cerns about public educational system); Raymond Hernandez, Anti-tax Groups Fight
School Budget Hikes, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Jan. 29, 1995, at 15A (indicating
growing nationwide concern over increasing public school budgets and questionable
school quality); Keeping School Reform on Track, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 16, 1995, at
8B (calling for continued government support in raising standards and expectations
for primary and secondary education); Reforming Primary Education, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 6, 1995, at B6 (pointing out reforms in Louisiana's public schools
after 1993 report indicated widespread use of inappropriate teaching, testing, re-
tention, and promotion practices for children grades K to 3); Peter Simon, Teacher
Training Assailed in Report; Panel Says University Programs Are Out of Touch With
Public Schools, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 29, 1995, at 4 (indicating universities offering
teaching degrees must take responsibility for dismal performance of our elementary
and high schools); Jeannie Smith, Why Johnny Can't Work: Faced with Graduates
Who Can't Read, Write, or Reason, Business Steps Into the Classroom, GREATER
BATON ROUGE Bus. REP., Jan. 24, 1995, at 26 (revealing that Louisiana's public
school students rank near bottom in most mathematics and science proficiency
tests); Jennifer Talhelm, State Education Leaders Call For Tougher Standards For
Schools, HERALD-SUN (N.C.), Jan. 13, 1995, at C1 (noting North Carolina's Governor
call to raise standards and provide quality education in all North Carolina schools);
Vanee Vines, Replacing the Rules With Innovation; Experimental Schools are Public
Education's Best Hope, Many Say, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 5, 1995, at Al (suggesting
that traditional public schools fail because neither students nor their parents have
input or choice in school educational programs and goals); Why Can't Joe College
Read?; Increasing Numbers of Cal State Enrollees Need Remedial Work in Basic
English and Math, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1995, at B7 (stating that California public
schools may be improving but are still graduating many students without basic
skills); Why Johnny Won't Stay In School, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 9, 1995, at 6A
(indicating one county school system has never achieved Maryland's state standard
for dropout rates); David Woolsey, Backers Believe Adoption of Charter Schools Can
Change Education for the Better, IDAHO STATESMAN, Jan. 8, 1995, at 1B (calling for
charter schools to improve Idaho's public school performance).
4 "[T]he current inefficiency of spending on public schools is well documented.
The United States already spends large sums per student relative to other ... coun-
tries, yet average test results for mathematics and science are poor .... " OR-
GANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC
SURVEYS: United States 52 Nov. 1993; see, e.g., Benjamin Akande, Six Ways to Save
Our Schools: It's Time to Set a National Goal-oriented Education Agenda to Improve
Students' Performance, Create Incentives for Good Teaching, Re-evaluate the Cur-
riculum, and Develop New Technology to Spur Learning, USA TODAY (MAGAZINE),
Nov. 1993, at 62 (stating nation's public education system has become "bureaucratic
haven with lost priorities"); Terry Anderson, When Schools Fail, We All Fail, BUFF.
NEWS, Oct. 12, 1995, at 3B (indicating Denver's public school system has no excuse
for its inefficiency, poor achievement, and apathy); Andre Cline, Money Won't Cure
Education's Ills, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 19, 1995, at F3
(indicating 1994 test results of North Carolina's eighth grade students revealed that
five counties which had lowest per pupil expenditures produced 9.5% more students
proficient in reading and 9.3% more proficient in mathematics). The North Carolina
study suggested that increased expenditures on education have proven ineffective in
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Public school budgets have grown rapidly, yet according to edu-
cational studies, the quality of education remains mediocre.5 In
contrast, media attention surrounding private schools focuses on
the schools' ability to provide better education with lower per-
pupil costs.6 Responses to the apparent inequality between pri-
vate and public school education have varied.7
raising students' performance in school "because the schools themselves are ineffi-
cient allocators of money." Id.; see James Dao, Vermont Official is Picked as State
Education Chief for New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at B1 (stating that New
York's Governor Pataki has indicated that New York State's Education Department
is "symbol of bureaucratic bloat, inefficiency and aloofness"); Funding Crisis?, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 17, 1995, at 18 (stating Illinois' public schools are adequately funded but
grossly inefficient); Joan Little, Schools' Budget Gets a Demerit; City District Count-
ers Group's Claim of "Bloated Central Bureaucracy," ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 26, 1995, at 1B (quoting local reform group, Project Appleseed, as stating "St.
Louis Public Schools waste millions of dollars each school year because of a bloated
central bureaucracy and inefficiently run schools...."); Jean Thompson, College-
Bound Steers Students the Right Way, BALTIMORE SUN, July 6, 1995, at 1B
(reviewing program that sends thousands of bright high school seniors to college
from public school systems that are too overwhelmed, impoverished or inefficient to
counsel them).
' "[The amount spent on each pupil in America's schools has increased un-
abated for a century ... however, student performance has, at best, stayed constant
and may have fallen." ERIC HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS xvii-xviii (Brookings Inst. 1994). The
author further details this phenomenon in a chapter entitled "Rising Expenditure,
Falling Performance." Id. at 25-39. In fact, the United States Department of Educa-
tion, National Center for Education Statistics reported that Washington, D.C., spent
more money per pupil than any other school system in the country yet ranked last
in mathematics and reading proficiency among all U.S. students. Cline, supra note
4, at F3.
a See, e.g., Mike Bowler, Catholic Schools: More For Less, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct.
8, 1995, at 2C (indicating Maryland's Harford County public school system enrolls
roughly same number of students as its Catholic school counterparts, yet spends
twice as much on each student, has half as many schools and has central office staff
nine times larger); Roger Harris, Study Shows Economic Impact of Catholic Schools,
BUSINESS FIRST (Louisville), Apr. 18, 1994, at 1 (according to University of Louis-
ville study, Louisville Catholic school system operates more efficiently than local
public schools and saves local taxpayers potentially $89 million per year); Little, su-
pra note 4 (suggesting "Catholic schools are more efficient because their manage-
ment is site-based ... parents, teachers and the principal make most decisions about
what is taught in their schools"); Private Schools Outperform Public Schools,
BUs./EDUC. INSIDER, June 1993, at 4 (noting that "[bly grade 12, only 14 percent of
public school students were at or above the '[plroficient! level, compared with 22
percent of Catholic school students and 36 percent of all students attending other
private schools"); Around the U.S.A, ETHNIC NEWSWATCH, Sept. 30, 1995, at 29
(reporting that fewer than half of Milwaukee public school students graduate and
only one-fourth go on to college, whereas 88% of Milwaukee private school students
graduate and three-fourths go to college).School reform initiatives across the country have taken many different ap-
proaches. See, e.g., Akande, supra note 4, at 62 (reviewing programs utilized
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Federal and state legislatures are considering, or have al-
ready enacted legislation which supports charter schools, paren-
tal school choice, and school voucher programs.8 Since the "Goals
2000 Educate America Act"9 was signed into law, forty-four
states have begun designing programs which will revamp their
education systems by the next century." In some municipalities,
local school officials have awarded contracts to school manage-
ment companies to run the public schools." In other cities,
throughout country to address school reform); Phil Linsalata, School Project Prom-
ises Improvements, SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL (Charleston), Aug. 20, 1995, at 11A
(noting privatization of four public school systems across country); Ohio's Voucher
Plan for Cleveland, First Program Approved in U.S. to Include Choice of Any Private
School, PR NEWSWIRE, June 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File
(indicating Ohio's Governor expected to sign law enacting fully participating school
voucher program for Cleveland public school system); Reforming Primary Educa-
tion, supra note 3, at B6 (noting that Louisiana has attempted to stimulate reform
by increasing money available through competitive grants which enable state
schools to better train teachers to monitor students' progress); Smith, supra note 3,
at 26 (noting "adopt a school program" is providing needed money to Louisiana
schools from corporate sources); Talhelm, supra note 3, at C1 (stating North Caro-
lina's Governor is calling for educational boot camps, flexibility for schools to reduce
considerably class size, and automatic expulsion for students found with weapons as
methods to improve schools); Kathy Walt, The 74th Legislature: Senate Passes
Voucher Plan for Education; Private Schools in Program Could Receive Public
Money, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28, 1995, at Al (stating Texas Senate overwhelmingly
passed legislation allowing for school voucher program); Woolsey, supra note 3, at
1B (indicating answer to Idaho school reform is charter schools).
8 See, e.g., H.R. 1640, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (calling for nationwide low
income school choice demonstration program); H.R. 1828, 109th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ind.
1995) (introducing school voucher program for Indiana); H.R. 2200, 89th Leg., 1995-
96 Sess. (11l. 1995) (proposing amendment to school code to allow "cash scholar-
ships"); S.R. 547, 117th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 1995) (proposing establishment of com-
prehensive school choice program using vouchers). Ohio and Wisconsin have en-
acted laws implementing fully participating school voucher programs. See 1995 Ohio
Legis. Serv. L-809 - L-824 (Baldwin); 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 27, § 4002 (West) (to
be codified at WIS. REV. CODE ANN. § 119.23 (West)) (amending § 119.23 to include
sectarian schools).
Charter school legislation, however, has been more predominant. As of January
1995, there were 134 charter schools approved in nine of the eleven states with
charter school laws. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605 (West 1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-30.5-109 (1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 89 (Law. Co-op. 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-8A-5 (Michie 1993). Additionally, a federal grant program was en-
acted to provide support for charter schools. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 8061-67 (1994).
9 Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5802 (1994). The purpose
of the act is "to establish National Education Goals." Id. § 5811.
10 "Secretary [of Education] Riley pointed out that today, just 8 months after the
'Goals 2000 Educate America Act' was signed into law, 44 states are designing, from
the bottom up, a better education system for the next century." 141 CONG. REc.
S1863, 1877, (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
" The Edison Project has contracted with Boston, Massachusetts, Wichita, Kan-
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schools have received support for their growing budgets through
large corporate grants.2 Most recently, privately funded voucher
programs have been implemented." School reform has become
the buzz word of the nation and the reaction has created small
pockets of change.14
There are both critics and supporters for all of the innova-
tive proposals currently under consideration at the federal and
state legislative levels. 5 Proposals for charter schools, 6 school
sas, Mount Clemens, Missouri, and Sherman, Texas to manage their public school
systems. See Phil Linsalata, supra note 7, at 11A. The Edison Project intends to
educate students using state of the art technology and innovative learning tech-
niques. See Associated Press, Edison Gets $30 Million For Profit-Making Schools,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 17, 1995, at C3. Analysts indicate that education represents
a $400 billion market and suggest it is "inevitable that for-profit firms" will enter
the education market. See James K. Glassman, It's Elementary: Buy Education
Stocks Now, WASH. POST, Jul. 2, 1995, at H1-H2. But see Jean Thompson, School
Board Urges Mayor to Drop EA; Schmoke Is Advised to End Contracts this Aca-
demic Year; Cost at Center of Dispute; Private Company Has Managed 9 City
Schools for 3 1/2 Years, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 22, 1995, at 1A (reporting Baltimore
school board's decision to fire Education Alternatives Inc., which was hired to man-
age schools). Reports from Miami and Hartford, cities which had also contracted
with Education Alternatives Inc., indicated dissatisfaction with the cost and student
test scores. Diane Scarponi, School Firm Loses Last Public Client, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 28, 1996, at 32A (noting that Miami and Baltimore had sev-
ered ties with EAI in 1995 and that Hartford had now dismissed EAI, leaving com-
pany with no remaining public clients).
.' See, e.g., Jeanne Allen & Michael J. McLaughlin, A Businessman's Guide To
The Education Reform Debate, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Dec. 21, 1990 (indicating
IBM spent over $42 million on education projects in 1988, AT&T spent $18 million
in 1990, and Chevron roughly $9 million in 1990); Smith, supra note 3, at 26
(reporting that Exxon has actively participated in "Adopt a School Program" which
allows business to help provide for education needs beyond what school system can
provide).
""The private voucher movement, launched by the Golden Rule Insurance
Company in Indianapolis [in 1991] continues to grow rapidly." Private Voucher Pro-
grams Flourish, Bus./EDUC. INSIDER, Nov. 1994, at 2. Fifteen major cities have es-
tablished private voucher initiatives. Id.; see infra notes 80-91 and accompanying
text (detailing private school voucher programs in effect).
'4 See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text (providing overview of school re-
form initiatives pending or implemented across nation).
"Compare A. Phillips Brooks & Jeff South, School-Choice Proposals Worry Re-
segregation Critics; Statistics Show Trend of Clustering of Minorities and Low-
Income Students, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 9, 1995, at Al (indicating attorney
for Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund believes school choice
programs could leave public schools more segregated than ever); and Education Re-
form and School Choice: Hearings on H.R. 1640 Before the Subcomm. on Early
Childhood, Youth and Families of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational
Opportunities, 104th Cong. (June 21, 1995) (testifying before committee, Barry W.
Lynn, Executive Director of Americans for Separation of Church and State, indi-
cated vigorous opposition to school tuition vouchers) with Clint Bolick, Opinion,
1996]
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choice, 17 privatization of schools, 8  and school vouchers 9  are
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 28, 1995, at All ("Choice can provide the catalyst for
long-overdue public school reform."); and Carol Innerst, Wisconsin Church Schools
Open with Vouchers in Use, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1995, at Al (quoting Susan
Mitchell, public policy and education consultant commenting on benefits of Wiscon-
sin's school voucher program as saying "Some of these kids who will be attending
schools in their own neighborhoods for the first time, ... will be off the bus and in
the community."). In addition, compare Jake Henshaw, GANNETT NEWS
(Sacramento), Nov. 16, 1995 (indicating education experts are concerned that char-
ter schools are operating under standards that are too lenient), and Doug Myers,
House Approves Bill on Charter Schools; Senate to Consider Amendments, AD-
VOCATE, June 7, 1995, at 1B (indicating parents concern that charter school legisla-
tion requires only 75% of teachers at charter schools to be certified by state to
teach), with Vines, supra note 3, at Al (suggesting charter schools are "country's
best hope for public education"), and Woolsey, supra note 3, at 1B (indicating char-
ter schools are one of most dramatic ways to increase parent involvement in school
operations).
6 See generally GAO REPORTS, supra note 3 (reviewing charter school legisla-
tion). Before a charter school can be created, the state's education law must be
amended. Id. Charter schools are not encumbered by the rigid standards facing the
public school systems. Id. A charter school has the freedom to create innovative
curricula and class schedules in ways it believes will yield the greatest benefit for
the students. Id. Although charter schools have more flexibility in their operation,
the key to their success may lie in increased parent and student involvement. Id.
The mission of most charter schools is not to create a place where middle school
children are treated as already "washed up," but rather to challenge them and culti-
vate their spirits so they acquire a thirst for learning. See Vines, supra note 3, at Al
(reviewing charter school programs across country). Students enroll in charter
schools by choice, creating an atmosphere in which parents, students, and teachers
are willing to do whatever it takes to make sure every child comes away with a solid
education. Id.
The nation's first charter school was opened in 1992 in a recreational center in
the impoverished east side of St. Paul, Minnesota. Id. This year-round school cur-
rently enrolls 50 troubled students between the ages of 13 and 20. Id. The school's
success is apparent when one considers that, in a time when traditional educational
models appear to be failing, all but two students in its first graduating class, and all
but one student in its most recent graduating class, have enrolled in post-secondary
institutions. Id. Following Minnesota's lead, 18 other states have enacted laws
which will enable communities to open charter schools. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
14.03.250 (1995) (establishing charter schools in Alaska); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605
(Deering 1995) (establishing charter schools in California); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-
8A-5 (Michie 1993). There is a great disparity, however, in these laws. See generally
GAO REPORTS, supra note 3 (comparing all charter school laws as of January 1995).
For example, Minnesota charter schools operate independently from the school dis-
trict while Colorado charter schools are operated by the local public school district.Id.
17 See supra note 1 (defining school choice); see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-
18-206 (Michie 1995) (giving students opportunity to apply for admission to school in
districts outside one in which they reside); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 12B (Law. Co-
op. 1995) (allowing students to cross district lines in choosing their schools as part of
state's school choice program); 1995 N.Y. Laws 82, § 84 (allowing commissioner of
education to approve school district applications for funding of development of pub-
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gaining popularity among parents and students.20  What does
this mean for the future of our public school system? Probably
nothing until the wall of resistance constructed by public schools
is hurdled or removed, thereby giving some of these innovative,
meritorious proposals the opportunity to be implemented na-
tionwide.
Among the many proposals offered to improve the quality of
the public education system, school voucher programs are
emerging as a preferred option.21 Part I of this Note outlines and
lic school choice programs). See generally COOKSON, supra note 1, at 38-70
(overviewing school choice concept); MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC EDUCATION: AN
AUTOPSY 299-302 (1993) (providing overview of reaction to school choice plan sug-
gested by former Presidents Reagan and Bush).
" Privatization of schools is a recent addition to the school reform movement.
See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 17, at 318- 27 (commenting on Edison Project entry
into school reform initiatives). Under a privatization program, the public school sys-
tem is managed and operated by a for-profit business under contract with the mu-
nicipality. See Linsalata, supra note 7, at 11A (describing how Edison project func-
tions); Bill Zlatos, Privatizing Schools Tests a Pittsburgh Suburb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1995, at B6 (discussing first instance in country where privatization plan called
for replacement of unionized teachers with company employees); see also supra note
11 and accompanying text (discussing privatization programs currently in effect).
19 See supra note 1 (defining fully participating school voucher and school
choice/voucher programs); see also WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1994) (providing school
choice/voucher program for low-income children attending Milwaukee school); 1995
Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 (West) (amending § 119.23 to include sectarian schools and thus
creating fully participating school voucher program); 1995 Ohio Legis. Serv. 117
(Baldwin) (adopting fully participating school voucher program limited to low-
income students attending school in Cleveland). See generally Henry M. Levin, The
Theory of Choice Applied to Education, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION: THE THEORY OF CHOICE AND CONTROL IN EDUCATION 255-66 (William
H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990) [hereinafter CHOICE AND CONTROL] (reviewing
varying educational voucher mechanisms).
20 See, e.g., Dale D. Buss, Payday For Vouchers? School Choice Remains Popular
Idea, But Public Education Activists See a Grave Threat, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct.
23, 1995, at 76 (noting that November 1994 elections revitalized voucher movement
because many anti-choice Democrats in state legislatures were not reelected); Vines,
supra note 3, at Al (quoting charter school student saying "'I like it here ... because
it's smaller and they try to teach you more. I feel like everyone really wants to suc-
ceed.'"); High Marks For Wisconsin Scholarship Program, HERITAGE FOUND. REP.,
Oct. 1995, at 2 [hereinafter, High Marks] ("The overwhelming majority of parents
were satisfied with the performance of the schools.").
21 See Buss, supra note 20, at 76 (indicating choice programs provide parents
with opportunity to choose among schools); Maria Koklanaris, Fairfax County to
Hold Hearing on School Choice, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at C5 (citing national
survey polls indicating 69% of parents favor school choice plans which include pub-
lic, private and parochial schools); Mary Ellen Leary, This Voucher Defeat is the
Start of Reform, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 10, 1993, at 31 (noting defeat of California's
school voucher program represents beginning of national push for parental school
choice); JOEL SPRING, AMERICAN EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND
1996]
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explains the basic structure of a school voucher program. The
outline highlights current proposals both in Congress and in
state legislatures which call for the implementation of school
voucher programs, and discusses the status of the only voucher
program currently operating in this country. Part II addresses
the constitutional issues raised by school voucher programs,
specifically challenges under the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause, and argues that school vouchers can withstand
such challenges. Part III demonstrates why school vouchers will
work in reforming our public schools and discusses the criticisms
levied against these programs.
I. SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAMS: PROVIDING FREEDOM OF
CHOICE
School voucher programs would allow parents to choose
where to send their children to school.22 A voucher program
would empower the parents of public school students with the
freedom to select an alternative school.23 Under the program,
parents would receive a voucher, redeemable at participating
schools, to fund the cost of their child's education.24 The state
POLITICAL ASPECTS 162 (1991) (noting choice/voucher programs give parents options
in selection of their child's school). See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE,
POLITICS, MARKETS & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990) (detailing structure of
school/choice voucher programs and their utility in public school reform); Philip T.K.
Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can The Polemic of Legal
Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAuL L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1993) (providing history of pa-
rental choice and voucher concept).
"See COOKSON, supra note 1, at 16 (stating vouchers are fumding mechanisms
which enable public school students to attend any school of their choice); Judith
Areen & Christopher Jencks, Education Vouchers: A Proposal for Diversity and
Choice, in EDUCATIONAL VOuCHERS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 49, 51 (George
R. La Noue ed., 1972) ("[Plarents could take this voucher to any school which agreed
to abide by the rules of the voucher system.").
"See Areen & Jencks, supra note 22, at 50 ("[Without vouchers] only relatively
affluent parents retain any effective control over the education of their children.
Only they are free to move to areas with 'good' public schools ... [and o]nly they can
afford nonsectarian private schooling."); John E. Coons & Stephen D. Sugarman,
Vouchers For Public Schools, in 15 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 60 (1973) (claiming
that vouchers offer choices to parents between public and private schools).
24See generally Areen & Jencks, supra note 22 (providing overview of standard
voucher programs, which provide parents with voucher redeemable at any partici-
pating school); Levin, supra note 19, at 257 (overviewing financial component of
voucher programs); John E. Coons & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Tax Cred-
its Versus School Vouchers: Comment on the California Tuition Tax Credit Proposal,
in FAMILY CHOICE IN SCHOOLING: ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 169, 169-70 (Michael E.
Manley-Casimir ed., 1982) [hereinafter FAMILY CHOICE] (indicating that voucher
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would provide the voucher, the value of which is fixed and typi-
cally based on some percentage of the per-pupil public school at-
tendance cost.' A fully participating voucher program 6 would
enable parents to redeem the voucher at any public or private
school-non-sectarian or sectarian-that chooses to participate
in the program. In contrast, a school choice/voucher program
would limit participation to public and non-sectarian private
schools only.' If the voucher is redeemed at a public school, no
further tuition payment would be due;29 however, further tuition
payments may be required if redemption is at a private school."
Wisconsin was the first state to enact legislation implement-
ing a school voucher program."1 The original legislation adopted
plan would give scholarship worth its face value to both participating family and
selected school).
2 See WIs. STAT. § 119.23(4) (1994) (determining voucher value from public
school per pupil cost); COOKSON, supra note 1, at 16 (indicating voucher has fixed
value); LIEBERMAN, supra note 17, at 156 ("Many voucher proposals base the
amount of the voucher on per-pupil costs in public schools."); Coons & Sugarman,
supra note 24, at 169-70 (indicating voucher value is percentage of money spent on
children in public schools).
26 See supra note 1 (defining fully participating voucher program for purposes of
this Note). Wisconsin and Ohio are the only two states that have enacted laws pro-
viding for fully participating voucher programs. See 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 § 4002
(West); 1995 Ohio Legis. Serv. 117 § 3813.976 (Baldwin). Pending federal legislation
also provides for a fully participating voucher program. See H.R. 1640, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995).
27 See COOKSON, supra note 1, at 16 (defining voucher program as "system of
certificate or cash payments by the government that enables public school students
to attend schools of their choice, public or private"). Wisconsin's revised "Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program" and Ohio's newly adopted "Scholarship Program" allow
all schools-public, private, sectarian, and nonsectarian-to participate in the
voucher program. See 1995 Wis. Legis Serv. 27 § 4002 (West) (deleting from §
119.23(2)(a) "nonsectarian" restriction on private schools eligible to participate);
1995 Ohio Legis. Serv. 117 § 3313.976(A) (Baldwin) (describing private school re-
quirements for participation in program, not limited to nonsectarian schools).
2 See supra note 1 (defining school choice/voucher program). The original Mil-
waukee Parental Choice Program limited the participating schools to public and
private nonsectarian schools. See WIS. STAT § 119.23(2)(a) (1994).
29 See WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1994) (addressing funding for participating private
schools only, participating public schools continue to receive funding as they do un-
der existing education law).
20 See 1995 Ohio Legis. Serv. 117 § 3313.976(8) (Baldwin) (limiting participating
private schools to charges of maximum of 10% of voucher amount for tuition). But
see WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (1994) (allowing eligible students to attend any partici-
pating school "at no charge"); 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 § 4002 (West) (leaving "at no
charge" provision).
3' WIs. STAT. § 119.23 (1994) (establishing "Milwaukee Parental Choice Pro-
gram" which enables parents to send their children to any public school or private
non-sectarian school of their choice).
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was a school choice/voucher program enabling parents to cross
district lines to enroll their children in any public or non-
sectarian private school of their choice.32 The original law estab-
lished the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("MPCP), 33 and
stated "any pupil in grades kindergarten to 12 who resides
within the city [of Milwaukee] may attend, at no charge, any
non-sectarian private school located in the city."34 To participate
in the program, a student's family income could not exceed 1.75
times the poverty level as determined under federal law.35 Relig-
ious schools were not eligible to participate in the program.36
Once a child was enrolled, the parents or guardians were re-
quired to submit proof of enrollment to the State Superinten-
dent.37 Upon receipt of such proof, the Superintendent author-
ized tuition payments directly to the private school.38  The
Wisconsin Legislature appropriated funds which flowed directly
from the state treasury to the private school.
The original Wisconsin statute survived challenges under
the Wisconsin Constitution as well as the United States Consti-
tution. ° In May of 1995, the Wisconsin Legislature's Joint Fi-
32 § 119.23(2)(a) ([any pupil in grades kindergarten to 12 who resides within
the city may attend, at no charge, any nonsectarian private school located in the city
See WIS. STAT. § 119.23.
§ 119. 23(2)(a).
31 § 119.23(2)(a)(1).
"6 § 119.23(2)(a) (limiting participating private schools to nonsectarian schools).
The 1995 amendments expanded the program to include sectarian private schools.
See 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 § 4002 (West) (deleting nonsectarian restriction).
37 Wis. STAT. § 119.23(3) (1994).
' § 119.23(4).
39 Id.
40 See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 477 (Wis. 1992) (holding MPCP did not
violate Wisconsin Constitution); Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D.
Wis.), vacated, 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that MPCP did not violate First
Amendment's Establishment Clause by not including religious schools in choice pro-
gram). In Miller, the issue before the District Court was whether the MPCP "which
reimburses private nonreligious schools for the tuition of eligible children, must also
reimburse private religious schools for the tuition of similarly situated children." Id.
at 1210. The court held that "[t]he present state of First Amendment law compels
this court to hold that the plaintiffs request to expand the Current Choice Program
[MPCP] to make tuition reimbursements directly payable to religious private
schools who admit eligible [MPCP] schoolchildren would violate the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 1216. The Miller court indicated that the critical issue under Estab-
lishment Clause analysis is whether the benefits of the program were made avail-
able to "all parents" or to a selected group, i.e. "only to parents of children in non-
public schools." Id. at 1215 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983)).
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nance Committee voted to expand and transform the state's
"school choice" program 1 to include private sectarian schools,
thereby creating a fully participating voucher program.42 The
bill was enacted in July of 1995. 4" Under the revised legislation,
the percentage of Milwaukee students allowed to participate in
the program was increased to fifteen percent." Additionally, un-
der the revised program, the voucher would be issued in the par-
ents' name and then sent directly to the participating school of
choice." The parents authorize tuition payment to the school by
endorsing the check.46
Immediately after the revisions took effect, the legislation
was challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.47 In re-
sponse to the challenge, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a
temporary injunction preventing the state from sending any
funds under the MPCP to any participating sectarian school.48 A
41 See H.R. 1266, 91st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1993-94) (proposing modifications
to choice program to include sectarian schools).
4 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 § 4002 (West) (deleting word "nonsectarian" from
description of participating private school in WIs. STAT. §119.23(2)(a)). See supra
note 1 (defining fully participating voucher program).
13 See 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 § 4002 (West).
"H.R. 1266, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1993-94) (amending WIS. STAT. §
119.23(2)(b) which allowed only 1% student participation).
' 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 § 4006m (West) (amending WIS. STAT. § 119.23(4) to
instruct education department to send check to private school and then parent
"shall restrictively endorse the check for the use of the private school").
4; Id.
"' See, e.g., Carol Innerst, Wisconsin Hires Starr to Defend School Plan; Vouch-
ers for Religious Schools Under Fire, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at A4 (indicating
"American Civil Liberties Union responded first with a lawsuit challenging the con-
stitutionality of the expanded program"); Cary Segall, Court Hears "Choice" Argu-
ments; Constitutionality of Payment Program for Poor Pupils Turns on Religious Is-
sue, WIS. STATE J., Aug. 24, 1995, at 1B (indicating that Wisconsin Supreme Court
heard arguments on constitutionality of MPCP).
'8 See, e.g., Joel Dresang, Business Puts Its Money Behind Support for Choice,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 1, 1995, at B1 (noting Wisconsin's high court de-
layed dispersal of state money to religious schools while court considered constitu-
tional challenges); Wisconsin Private Philanthropists Support Choice, BUSJEDUC.
INSIDER, Oct. 1995, at 2 [hereinafter Private Philanthropists] (indicating Wisconsin
Supreme Court issued injunction halting program's inclusion of religious schools).
As a result of the injunction, business and private donations have been collected to-
taling more than $1.8 million to help give the children of Milwaukee the ability to
stay in their school of choice. Id.
The Wisconsin Senate, anticipating the possible nullification of the amended
law, has introduced a bill repealing the inclusion of sectarian schools in the MPCP.
See S.R. 424, 92nd Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1995-96).
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final decision is expected soon.49 Analysts predict that irrespec-
tive of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding, a writ of certio-
rari will be made to the United States Supreme Court.0 If, how-
ever, the Wisconsin Supreme Court bases its decision solely on
the Wisconsin Constitution, advocates for the program will have
little opportunity for appeal.51
At the federal level, proposed public school reform legisla-
tion includes a bill to establish a low-income school voucher pro-
gram.52  The Low-Income School Choice Demonstration Act of
1995 would provide financial assistance to low-income parents,
thereby allowing them to "select the public or private schools
their children will attend."53 The purpose of the program is to
'9 See Private Philanthropists, supra note 48 (indicating attorney supporting
students anticipates decision by end of year).
'0 Id. (quoting Landmark Legal Foundation of Kansas City, Missouri) ("[The
Milwaukee school choice litigation will ultimately result in a major U.S. Supreme
Court decision"); see Richard P. Jones, Some Say Battle Could End With Wisconsin
Supreme Court Ruling, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 18, 1995, at 5 (indicating
that when Wisconsin Governor signed amended legislation he expected U.S. Su-
preme Court to ultimately decide case).
" See Jones, supra note 50 (commenting that decision under Wisconsin's Con-
stitution would preclude opportunity for appeal by advocates of program). The lan-
guage of the Wisconsin Constitution is more restrictive than that of the United
States Constitution's First Amendment. Id. Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin
Constitution states:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dic-
tates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be com-
pelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any
religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be
drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or
theological seminaries.
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
Political science professor at Marquette University, Christopher Wolfe, has
stated:
The state Supreme Court has tied the Wisconsin religious provisions of the
constitution pretty closely to the religious provisions of the federal consti-
tution .... If they stick by precedent, [Governor] Thompson's going to win
.... If they decide to read the difference between the two constitutions more
sharply, then on that ground, they might strike down school choice.
Jones, supra note 50. Gordon Baldwin, constitutional law professor at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison, indicated that if the court should invalidate the program,
the governor could raise an equal protection issue in a federal appeal. Id. "[Dlenying
freedom of choice to parents, denies equal protection in an area where parents have
an interest in deciding how to educate their children." Id.
52 See H.R. 1640, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introducing bill entitled "Low-
Income School Choice Demonstration Act of 1995").
53 Id. § 2.
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enable Congress to determine the effects of school choice on par-
ticipating students and schools.' The bill would establish be-
tween ten and twenty school choice programs across the coun-
try,55 providing low-income parents with an education certificate
for the cost of enrolling their eligible children in a choice school.
5 6
The amount of the certificate should be sufficient to provide re-
cipients with the maximum degree of choice in their school se-
lection.57 The certificate amount, however, cannot exceed the
current local, per-pupil, public school expenditure.58
At the state level, there is an abundance of proposals for
school choice/voucher and fully participating voucher programs.59
Recently, the Connecticut legislature rejected a bill that would
have established a fully participating school voucher program."
This rejection followed the defeat of the largest effort to enact a
fully participating school voucher program, California's Proposi-
tion 174.61 Proposition 174, a state-wide proposal which was in-
5 Id. (stating that purpose is to evaluate effect of choice in schooling by provid-
ing financial assistance to low-income parents).
Id. § 5(b)(1) (stating that "Secretary [of Education] shall award grants to eli-
gible [education providers] to enable such [providers] to carry out at least 10, but
not more than 20, demonstration projects ...").
' Id. A "choice school" is defined as any public or private, including sectarian,
school involved in a demonstration project. H.R. 1640, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1)
(1995). The term "low-income parent" is not formally defined in the bill. See id. § 3.
5? Id. § 8(a)(1).
Id. § 8(c).
19 See, e.g., S.R. 657, 179th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995-96) (proposing pilot
tuition grant program for students to attend public schools selected by parents);
H.R. 655, 89th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1995-96) (proposing school choice/voucher
law for state of Illinois); S.R. 547, 117th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1995) (proposing
comprehensive school choice program); S.R. 55, 42nd Legis., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1995)
(proposing school choice/voucher program for New Mexico); H.R. 2754, 75th Leg.
Sess., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1993-94) (proposing school choice/voucher act); A.B. 400,
206th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1994) (proposing school choice pilot program for
pupils residing in certain school districts); H.R. 2362, 178th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 1993) (proposing school choice/voucher act); H.R. 91, 73rd Leg. Sess., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 1993) (proposing fully participating school voucher program for Texas).
co S.R. 310, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995); H.R. 5891, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995)
(proposing fiully participating school choice program for Connecticut); see also 3
STATE CAPITOLS REPORT 26 (1995) (indicating that proposed private school tuition
voucher plan did not pass).
"1 March Fong Eu, Secretary of State of California, California Ballot Pamphlet:
Special Statewide Election, Nov. 2, 1993, at 32 (1993). See generally Cynthia Bright,
The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private Choice and Proposition 174,
31 CAL. W. L. REV. 193 (1995) (analyzing constitutionality of Proposition 174 under
Establishment Clause, as well as policy arguments both for and against proposi-
tion). The proposal attempted to amend Article IX of California's Constitution to in-
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cluded as a ballot item in the 1993 election,62 offered an educa-
tional scholarship for every resident, school-aged child in Cali-
fornia. 3 Scholarships were redeemable at any scholarship-
redeeming school, which included public, private, and sectarian
schools that met minimal non-discriminatory requirements."
Proposition 174 was overwhelmingly defeated.65
Despite limited success at the state level, school voucher
programs are increasing in popularity.66 At least a dozen states
have voucher program initiatives pending. 7 One might ask why.
clude the "Parental Choice in Education Amendment." Id. at 231 (including text of
proposed law stating "[a]ll parents are hereby empowered to choose any school,
public or private, for the education of their children ... ").
Id. at 194 ("[Proposition 174] offered the purest test for the popularity of a
radical voucher program because of its state-wide scope ... "). The Excellence
through Choice in Education League procured signatures to qualify the "Parental
Choice in Education" initiative for the election ballot. Id. at 201.
63 "The State shall annually provide a scholarship to every resident school-age
child." Id. at 231 (quoting Proposition 174 § 17(a)).
6 Bright, supra note 61, at 231 (noting that Proposition 174 § 17(a) empowered
parents with scholarships redeemable at any participating school). Proposition 174
defined "scholarship-redeeming school" as any public or private school in state of
California. Id. at 234 (quoting Proposition 174 § 17(d)(7)).
6" See id. at 201 (noting that Proposition 174 was voted down by 70%); see also
Mary Ellen Leary, This Voucher Defeat Is the Start of Reform, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10,
1993, at 31 (arguing that result of vote was less important than its effect of moving
vouchers into center of political debate); Peter H. King, On California: Readin' and
Writin' and Revolution, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, at A3 (discussing identity and
motivations of those who supported Proposition 174).
66 See, e.g., Meg James, Tuition Vouchers In Lawmakers' Curriculum, PALM
BEACH POST, Nov. 20, 1995, at 1A (indicating that Florida lawmakers have begun
filing voucher bill legislation); Buss, supra note 20, at 76 (indicating national move-
ment of lawmakers responding to parent's demands for school voucher programs);
Ed Rauchut, School Vouchers Gain Momentum, OMAHA-WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 29,
1995, at 13B (stating that "school choice is on a roll"); Joan Walsh, S.F. Schools at
the Crossroads; Dialogue About Race, Class and Public Education Long Overdue,
S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 7, 1993, at D1 (predicting that despite defeat of Proposition
174, "voucher movement will ultimately prevail").
67 See supra note 59 (listing states which already have proposed school
choice/voucher legislation). Wisconsin and Ohio are the only two states that have
passed legislation implementing a fully participating school voucher pilot program.
See 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 (West); 1995 Ohio Legis. Serv. 117 § 8313.976
(Baldwin). The laws in both states provide for a voucher program for selected mu-
nicipalities. WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1994) (limiting program to students residing
within Milwaukee city limits and attending non-sectarian schools); 1995 Ohio Legis.
Serv. § 3313.975 (Baldwin) (describing pilot scholarship program for Cleveland
school district, which would allow certain number of students to attend "alternative"
schools). Wisconsin is the only state to have an operating school choice/voucher pro-
gram. See supra note 31 (indicating program in effect since 1990). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has enjoined Wisconsin's amended legislation. See supra note 48.
The Ohio legislation is scheduled to take effect for the 1996-97 school year. See Scott
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School voucher programs are considered to be a logical solution
to public school reform. They are vigorously opposed, however,
by public school special interest groups such as the National
Education Association ("NEA7)."8 These organizations have allo-
cated significant resources to lobby against the proposals.69 In
contrast, most supporters of voucher programs are parents with
limited financial resources. ° Some school choice advocates view
voucher programs as a way to break the public school system's
monopoly. 1 They contend that school voucher programs would
create a competitive environment which would ultimately result
in better education for both the private and public school stu-
Stephens, School Voucher Deadline Nears, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 18, 1995, at 4E.
' See, e.g., JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITs OF THE
MARKET METAPHOR 66 (1994) (indicating that NEA, among other educational inter-
est groups, is opposed to voucher programs); LIEBERMAN, supra note 17, at 337
(indicating that at NEA convention, California's Teacher Association President
stated, "We decided to create an organized campaign to block [Proposition 174] from
getting enough signatures to qualify for the ballot."); Bright, supra note 61, at 202
(indicating seven major education organizations opposed Proposition 174); Voucher
Wars, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 12, 1995 (editorial) (stating that American Civil Liber-
ties Union claimed Wisconsin's voucher program violated First Amendment separa-
tion of church and state); Buss, supra note 20, at 76 (indicating that NEA is consid-
ering lodging court challenge against Ohio choice program); Jean Merl, Colorado is
Battleground for School Voucher System; Education: Both Sides Are Bringing in
Their Big Guns Over a Ballot Initiative that Would Provide Tax Dollars for Parents
Who Want To Choose Non-Public Institutions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992, at A3
(noting that local and national public school establishment groups have lobbied
against Colorado's school voucher initiative); School Choice, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1995, at A5 (noting teacher unions and civil liberties groups plan to resist proposed
federal school voucher program).
69 See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 17, at 332 (indicating that California's
Teachers Association raised $10 million to fight Proposition 174); School Choice:
Parents Deserve the Freedom to Pick Best Schools for Kids, CINN. ENQUIRER, Mar. 5,
1995, at H2 (noting opposition to choice is "fierce" and NEA spent $12 million to de-
feat Proposition 174).
70 See, e.g., Buss, supra note 20, at 76 (noting that parents are worried about
their lack of influence over their children's education); Ellen Debenport, School
Vouchers on Trial, TIMES UNION, Nov. 5, 1995, at El (quoting low-income parent in
Milwaukee disappointed by halt in newly amended choice program).
71 See, e.g., HANUSHE, supra note 5, at 103 ("Most public schools effectively
have a local monopoly; parents living in a certain area have no choice over which
school their children attend. Giving parents and students the ability to choose ...
[will] effectively give them, rather than school administrators, the power to define a
'good' education and to shape the schools accordingly."); HENIG, supra note 68, at 59-
64 (discussing public monopolies and how voucher programs can create competitive
market); Areen & Jencks, supra note 22, at 51 ("A voucher system seeks to free
schools from the restrictions which inevitably accompany their present monopolistic
privileges.").
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dent.72 Competition is the core of the nation's economy and the
reason why consumers receive better products, lower prices, and
a choice of services and products.73
72 See, e.g., COOKSON, supra note 1, at 20-37 (providing history of choice move-
ment and underlying competition theory); HENIG, supra note 68, at 78 (quoting for-
mer President George Bush, "'It's time parents were free to choose the schools that
their children attend. This approach will create the competitive climate that stimu-
lates excellence in our private and parochial schools as well.'"); LIEBERMAN, supra
note 17, at 10-14 (indicating system of educational vouchers is one alternative that
can create competitive market system in education); Milton Friedman, The Role of
Government, in EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS, supra note 22, at 9 (indicating competi-
tive market theory in education would result in more opportunity for quality educa-
tion); Levin, supra note 19, at 247, 255 (citing philosophers and economists such as
Adam Smith, Thomas Paine, and Milton Friedman and their arguments in favor of
market system of education); see also Peter Buttress, School-Choice Issue Debated;
Panelists Discuss Pros and Cons at Manchester Forum, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov.
14, 1995, at BI (quoting advocate of school choice as stating "[mlonopolies are inef-
ficient, ineffective, and unresponsive to the needs of consumers ... Even in the pres-
ence of abject failure in our inner-city schools, competitors are prohibited from offer-
ing an alternative."); Stanley Moss, School Vouchers-Will they save or destroy
public education?, CAL. J., Jun. 1, 1992 (citing Milton Friedman, Adam Smith, and
Thomas Paine as early proponents of educational voucher concept as means of infus-
ing competitive market effects into educational system); Dane Smith & Patricia
Lopez Baden, Brandl-Weber Report Calls for Change in Budgeting Philosophy, STAR
TRIB., Nov. 14, 1995, at 1A (indicating that new plan for Minnesota's government
calls for transformation of "state and local governments from monopoly producers of
services to financiers or arrangers of those services"--including school voucher pro-
gram to create competition from private and nonprofit groups).
73 See MARSHALL C. HOwARD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MARKETING (1964) (discussing
laws which open free competition and private enterprise). Mr. Howard expressed
the contemporary rationale of the positive effects of free competition as:
The producer-seller must satisfy the customers' wants. To do this he must
know the customers' wants and be able to satisfy them as well as or better
than business rivals can. Competition can be in terms of price, quality, na-
ture of the product or service, or conditions of sale. The successful pro-
ducer-seller is the one who has been most skillful in researching the buy-
ers' wants, in procuring the resources to satisfy those wants, in making the
goods available in desired form to the users, and in promoting sales. Other
things being equal, this is accomplished by offering the best-quality goods
at the lowest prices and on the most convenient terms of sale and delivery.
Competition forces the business rivals to provide the best for the least. The
efficient firms will be profitable and survive; the inefficient will not.
Id. at 1-2.
Cf. MALCOLM GETZ & DONALD S. WATSON, PRICE THEORY AND ITS USES 299-
324 (5th ed. 1981) (discussing interplay between competition and economic welfare
in purely and partially competitive markets); Fredric J. Entin, et al., Hospital Col-
laboration: The Need For An Appropriate Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
107, 126 (1994) (quoting Anthony E. Harris, Government's Closing Argument in
Carilion Health Sys., 16 U..S. Dep't of Justice 1636-37) ("[C]ourts, like Congress,
have said that the backbone of this economy is competition, and there should be
very, very compelling reasons for destroying competition....").
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The goal of the drafters of the MPCP is consistent with the
theory underlying school voucher programs-a competitive mar-
ket place in education will foster public school reform. '4 Milwau-
kee public schools are in need of reform and the legislature is
convinced that school vouchers are the solution." A 1995 survey
conducted by the University of Wisconsin at Madison supports
the legislature's view." The survey revealed that 31.4% of all
Milwaukee public school teachers---"who are required by condi-
tion of employment to live within the city imits-enroll[ed] their
own children in private schools."77 The survey also indicated that
44.5% of the public school teachers residing in Milwaukee's Cen-
tral City neighborhoods selected private schools for their chil-
dren." These statistics clearly indicate a "'no confidence' vote in
urban public education by the people who know it best.""
Society's position on school voucher programs is reflected by
the rise in privately funded versions.0 A private voucher pro-
"' See Amy Stuart Wells, Education; Milwaukee Parents Get More Choice on
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1990, at B9 (quoting Wisconsin Governor Tommy
Thompson, "Choice gives poor students the ability to select the best school that they
possibly can... . The [Milwaukee Parental Choice Program] allows for choice and
competition, and I believe competition will make both the public and private schools
that much stronger.'"); EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 28, 1990 (quoting bill sponsor Annette
Williams, state representative, "Iw]e're now going to show that our children can be
educated successfully for less than half the money that the Milwaukee schools use
to miseducate our students"). But see Jim Hilton, Note, Local Autonomy, Educa-
tional Equity and Choice: A Criticism of a Proposal to Reform America's Education
System, 72 B.U. L. REV. 973, 987 (1992) (conceding that competition may augment
quality of education offered to some, but maintaining that if competition has effect
of driving down quality of education for others, it will be unconstitutional).
75 See supra note 74; COOKSON, supra note 1, at 66-67 (noting sponsor of bill's
motivation for legislation was attempt to improve Milwaukee's public schools);
LIEBERMAN, supra note 17, at 10-11 (indicating that supporters of educational
vouchers believe that voucher system will foster competition and improve schools);
Janet Weiss, Control in School Organizations: Theoretical Perspectives, in CHOICE
AND CONTROL, supra note 19, at 112 (indicating advocates of Milwaukee choice pro-
gram hope that "breaking the monopoly of the local public school will lead schools to
be more responsive to parental concerns and preferences.").
7 See Daniel McGroarty, Teacher Knows Best, NAT'L REV., Sept. 25, 1995 at 62,
63 (citing to University of Wisconsin at Madison's Applied Population Laboratory
survey).




so See, e.g., COOKSON, supra note 1, at 41 (indicating Pat Rooney of Golden Rule
Insurance Co., organized $1.5 million private scholarship program for low-income
children in 1991); Private Voucher Programs Flourish, supra note 13 (indicating
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gram is one in which funding for the voucher is derived from pri-
vate donations.81  The private voucher movement was launched
three years ago in Indianapolis and has continued to grow rap-
idly.82 Privately funded programs circumvent the legal issues
which surround publicly funded voucher programs.' Further-
more, private voucher programs avoid the wrath of public school
interest groups which fight the implementation of publicly
funded voucher programs.' Over twenty metropolitan cities
across the nation have established privately funded voucher pro-
grams."s To date, more than 10,000 children are able to attend
that Golden Rule Insurance Co.'s program continues to grow rapidly); Ed Carson,
Going Private: Trends, REASON, Nov. 1994, at 16 (indicating that San Antonio's
Children's Educational Opportunity Foundation is operating privately funded
voucher program); Judith Cebula & Rebecca Buckman, Local Businesses Give $1.3
Million to Catholic Schools; Money Will Help Fund Scholarships for Kids in 8 Inner-
City Schools, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 31, 1995, at El (noting that $1.3 million in
corporate donations were given to fund scholarships at 8 Indianapolis central-city
Catholic elementary schools); Michael P. Garber, Time to Ring the Bell for School
Reform, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 5, 1995, at G1 ("The success of the 11 pri-
vately funded voucher programs operating around the country ... is further evidence
of the public's support of choice."); Jean Merl, Private School Scholarships Given to
Needy, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 15, 1994, at 3A (noting that new foundation supporting
school vouchers is offering $2.4 million in private school scholarships for low-income
children in Los Angeles and Orange Counties).
The outpouring of money by private citizens and businesses to counteract the
enjoinment of the newly expanded Milwaukee Choice Program is illustrative of the
public's conviction regarding school voucher programs. See Private Philanthropists,
supra note 48 (noting that $1.8 million was donated by private citizens of Wisconsin
as of September 22, 1995 to help give children of Milwaukee right to stay in schools
of their choice).
8' See Private Voucher Programs Flourish, supra note 13.
' Id.; see also Carson, supra note 80, at 16 (indicating that privately funded
choice programs now serve approximately 7,000-8,000 children across country);
Garber, supra note 80, at GI (noting that since Golden Rule program started 11
more programs are operating around country); Merl, supra note 80, at 3A (noting
that privately funded vouchers are operating in about dozen U.S. cities).
See Carson, supra note 80, at 16 (noting privately funded voucher programs
avoid "possible restrictions" imposed on government sponsored programs); Garber,
supra note 80, at G1 (contending that private sector can implement reform options
without government hindrance and citing fact that Former Secretaries of Education
Lamar Alexander and Bill Bennett favor abolition of Department of Education);
Marcia Sielaff, Remarks at the Economic Discussion Group (Apr. 27, 1994)
(transcript available in 60 Vital Speeches 615) (indicating privately finded voucher
prog ams avoid all issues surrounding publicly funded vouchers).
See Garber, supra note 80, at G1 (indicating private sector can implement re-
form options without incurring attempts by organized interest groups, such as NEA,
to thwart efforts at reform).
See id. at G1 (noting first privately funded voucher program started in Indi-
anapolis); Mary McGrath, School Voucher Proposal Taps Corporations for Funds,
BERGEN REc., Oct. 19, 1995, at A3 (noting findings of Reason Foundation indicated
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the private school of their choice due to the generosity of busi-
nesses and individuals.86
The largest privately funded voucher program in the country
is operated in Milwaukee by Partners Advancing Values in Edu-
cation ("PAVE").87 PAVE awards over 2,000 scholarships, valued
at one half the yearly tuition at a private school, for elementary
and secondary school students in Milwaukee.' Participating
students attend almost one hundred private elementary and
thirteen private high schools in the city.89 The PAVE scholarship
recipients, according to the second-year report of the PAVE pro-
gram, "'scored at their expected grade level and ranked above
average on national percentile scores.'"' o Moreover, interviews
with the students, parents, and teachers indicate a genuine car-
ing and concern among teachers, high teacher expectations of
students, and substantial parental involvement.9 Despite the
that private voucher programs operated in 22 metropolitan areas nationally); see
also Private Voucher Programs Flourish, supra note 13 (noting foundations operat-
ing private voucher programs in San Antonio, Texas, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin are
to expand nationwide); Merl, supra note 80, at 3A (reporting foundation has estab-
lished private voucher program for Los Angeles and Orange Counties).
G See McGrath, supra note 85, at A3.
See High Marks, supra note 20, at 2. Dan McKinley has been Executive Direc-
tor of PAVE, a private scholarship organization serving low-income families, since it
was founded in 1991. See Laura Merisalo, The Continuing Battle Over School
Choice, Bus. J. (Milwaukee), Nov. 4, 1995, at 23. "PAVE is a private model of how
school choice can work for families." Id. But see Alex Molnar, School Closings Reveal
Flaw in Choice Program, CAPITAL TIMEs (Madison), Feb. 19, 1996, at 1C (reporting
problems which have arisen in PAVE program).
88 See High Marks, supra note 20 (stating that PAVE provided 2,654 scholar-
ships in 1994); Merisalo, supra note 87, at 23 (noting PAVE "pays half the tuition for
3,695 elementary children and 632 high school students" during 1995-96 school
year); Private Voucher Programs Flourish, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that PAVE,
largest private voucher program in the country, allocates program scholarships to
2,033 elementary school and 417 secondary students). But see Molnar, supra note
87, at C1 (stating that "[a]t the moment, the Milwaukee voucher program doesn't
provide enough money to start and run a viable school from scratch").
8" See Private Voucher Programs Flourish, supra note 13, at 2 (finding that stu-
dents in programs attend 92 different private elementary schools and 13 high
schools in Milwaukee); High Marks, supra note 20, at 2 (participating students at-
tend 84 elementary and 13 high schools).
9Private Voucher Programs Flourish, supra note 13, at 2 (quoting second-year
report of PAVE program prepared by Family Service America, "an international
nonprofit association dedicated to strengthening family life through services, edu-
cation, research, and advocacy").
9' Id.; see also High Marks, supra note 20, at 2 (noting high rates of parental
satisfaction with PAVE program after three years). A third year evaluation re-
vealed, among other things, 96% parental satisfaction with the teachers' perform-
ance, 97% with the program of instruction and 97% with opportunities for parental
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slow progress of publicly funded school voucher programs, the
rapid growth of privately funded plans illustrates that school
voucher programs remain highly desirable.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: CAN SCHOOL VOUCHER
PROGRAMS SURVIVE?
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution con-
tains the Establishment Clause which specifies, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the exercise thereof . The protection of religious liberty
is the central purpose of the Establishment Clause.93 School
voucher programs, which include private sectarian schools as
participating schools, are subject to the challenge that they vio-
late the Establishment Clause.94 Challengers contend that fully
participating voucher programs violate the prohibition against
direct governmental support of religious institutions.95
involvement. Id. "The overwhelming majority of parents were satisfied with the
performance of the schools.'" Id. (citing findings of third-year evaluation).
92 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989) (indicating pur-
pose of Establishment Clause is to protect secular liberty); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating common purpose of Religion
Clauses is to secure religious liberty); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449
(1971) (noting that central purpose of Establishment Clause is "the purpose of en-
suring governmental neutrality in matters of religion") (citations omitted); John N.
Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and
"Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEX. L. REV. 142, 196 (1963) (indicating purpose of Con-
stitution's religion clauses is to maximize religious freedom). See generally Arlin M.
Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1559 (1989) (providing historical overview of development of religious clauses doc-
trine); Robert A. Holland, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudication: Indi-
vidualism, Social Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying Threats
to Religious Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1595 (1992) (providing argument supporting
theory that religious liberty is central to Establishment Clause).
' See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (indicating Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program is currently challenged as violative of Establishment Clause); see
also Bright, supra note 61, at 228 (concluding that school voucher programs which
include sectarian schools run afoul of Establishment Clause); Daniel, supra note 21,
at 57 (indicating school choice plans which include sectarian schools have been
challenged under Establishment Clause); David Futterman, Note, School Choice
and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of Public Aid to Private Parochial
Schools, 81 GEO. L. J. 711, 714 (1993) (indicating that primary criticism of school
choice is that it violates Establishment Clause).
9" See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School
Choice, 62 U. CINN. L. REV. 37, 41 (1993) ("Under traditional Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, public assistance to sectarian schools is unconstitutional because
such aid invariably advances the religious mission of the sponsoring institution,
thereby violating the principle of government neutrality toward religion."); Walter
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The Supreme Court has recognized that interpreting the Es-
tablishment Clause as mandating total separation of church and
state is unrealistic and undesirable.96 Understanding the im-
practicality of requiring total separation, the Court requires the
government to maintain a position of neutrality with respect to
religion." The Court has established a three pronged test,
known as the "Lemon Test,"98 to determine if a statute contra-
venes the Establishment Clause.
Under the first prong of the Lemon Test, a statute must
have a "secular legislative purpose."" Secondly, the statute's
McCann & Judith Areen, Vouchers and The Citizen-Some Legal Questions, in
EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS, supra note 22, at 117 (indicating school voucher programs
that include sectarian schools may violate Establishment Clause).
' Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760
(1973) ("It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of
total separation ....").
The concept of "total separation of church and state" is derived from the views
of Thomas Jefferson. See Marla A. DeGaetano, Note, Making the Establishment
Clause in Reasonable Observer Cases More Reasonable, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 939,
942-46 (1993) (reviewing competing approaches employed in Establishment Clause
interpretation). The Supreme Court has quoted Mr. Jefferson as saying, "the clause
... was intended to erect'a wall of separation between church and State.'" Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). The Court, however, has recognized that "total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-3 (1984) (noting that total
separation between church and state is not possible); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing "constitutional obligation of
'neutrality'") (citations omitted); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442 (1962) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (expressing that Establishment Clause "leaves the Government in a
position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312 (1952) (finding that if separation were complete "the state and religion
would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly").
" See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993)
(finding that contrary rule would be undesirable, Court determined that "we have
consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to
an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also re-
ceive an attenuated financial benefit."); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding assistance provided to petitioner attending
sectarian school, under Washington's vocational rehabilitation program, was neutral
and indirect government benefit); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (holding
Minnesota statute allowing tax deductions for all parents including those sending
their children to sectarian schools, for certain school related expenses constitu-
tional, viewing benefit as neutral program, neither advancing nor inhibiting relig-
ion).
9" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (indicating that three tests which
have been enunciated by Court over years were combined to form Court's evaluation
process under Establishment Clause).
9 Id.
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
"principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion."' 0 Finally, the statute must not cultivate
an "'excessive government entanglement with religion."llThe
Court asserted that this test addresses the "three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involve-
ment of the sovereign in religious activity.""' 2
The objective of the "secular purpose" prong is to ensure that
the legislative process does not become a surrogate pulpit for re-
ligious institutions. 3 When applying the secular legislative
purpose test to religious aid legislation the Court's review is gen-
erally a cursory one."° The Supreme Court recognizes that "[a]
State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses in-
curred by parents-regardless of the type of schools their chil-
dren attend-evidences a purpose that is both secular and un-
derstandable.""5 Moreover, the drafters of most legislation are
skilled enough to write a statute in such a way as to avoid failing
this prong of the Lemon Test.' Not all legislation manages to
pass this test, however, and thus some statutes are found uncon-
stitutional. For example, the Court viewed a Kentucky statute
which required the posting of the Ten Commandments in each
public school classroom as a statute "plainly religious in nature"
and deemed it lacking a "secular legislative purpose." 7 Never-
"0 Id. (citations omitted).
'0' Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
'02 Id. at 612 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
103 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (noting statute in question presented potential
for "[plartisans of parochial schools, understandably concerned with rising costs and
sincerely dedicated to both the religious and secular educational missions of their
schools, will inevitably champion this cause and promote political action to achieve
their goals.").
104 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (indicating little time need be spent on inquiry into
legislative purpose because governmental assistance programs have consistently
survived this inquiry); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975) (stating that
brief inquiry into Congressional intent establishes legitimacy of secular legislative
purpose); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (stating that examination of legislative purpose
behind relevant statutes provides no basis for concluding intent was to advance re-
ligion).
107 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). The Court held a Kentucky statute
that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each
public school classroom in the state had no secular legislative purpose and violated
the Establishment Clause. Id.
The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on school-
[Vol. 70:273
SCHOOL CHOICE
theless, the Court typically recognizes the existence of strong
public interest in assuring the continued financial health of pri-
vate schools and the public's desire to maintain the highest
quality of education for their children.'
The Court faces a more difficult challenge when evaluating
legislation under the second prong of the Lemon Test.0 9 In ap-
plying this part of the Lemon Test to religious school aid cases,
the Supreme Court must consider whether the statute "advances
or inhibits religion" thereby impacting religious liberty.10 The
pivotal inquiry hinges on whether the financial aid flows either
directly or indirectly from the state to the sectarian school."'
room walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments are un-
deniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legisla-
tive recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact... . If
the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it
will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to
venerate and obey, the Commandments. However desirable this might be
as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under
the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 41-42 (footnote omitted).
'o' Id.
'o' See, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396 (noting difficulty in determining whether
statute has "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic
schools'") (citations omitted).
"0 See, e.g., Whitters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487-88 (1986) (holding that Washington statute which provided aid to individuals
for vocational education was constitutional because individual, not state, chooses
school); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395 (finding Minnesota statute providing tax deduc-
tions for educational expenses incurred by "all" parents, including those whose chil-
dren attend private sectarian schools, constitutional because of statute's broad, neu-
tral applicability); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (indicating that
there is more danger in providing statutory aid to church-related primary and sec-
ondary schools with impressionable children than to church-related colleges).
.. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religions Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (striking down New York statute which provided, inter alia, tuition grants
only for low income children attending non-public schools). The Court started its
analysis by noting that "the propriety of a legislature's purposes may not immunize
from further scrutiny a law which either has a primary effect that advances religion,
or which fosters excessive entanglements between Church and State." Id. at 774.
The Court determined the maintenance and repair provisions of the statute provid-
ing for "direct" benefits to nonpublic schools, "virtually all of which [were] Roman
Catholic" is violative of the Establishment Clause because "their effect, inevitably, is
to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools." Id. at 774, 779-
80. The Court invalidated the tuition reimbursement program for many of the same
reasons articulated under the maintenance and repair provisions and concluded
"[i]n the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived
from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological
purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is invalid." Id.
at 780. Moreover, the Court noted "[the precise] function of New York's law [is] to
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Indirect funding occurs when aid is made available to any parent
and then reaches the sectarian school by way of a private, inde-
pendent decision made by that parent.112 The Supreme Court re-
quires a state to use language when drafting a statute that
"maintain[s] an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor
'inhibiting' religion.""' The Court has reinforced its position on
the constitutionality of "neutral" state benefits by finding lawful
a benefit which was made available to all individuals, and re-
quired the recipient to determine where the benefit was used."'
General government programs which distribute benefits neu-
trally to any qualifying child "without regard to the 'sectarian-
non-sectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child
attends ... [and providing] parents [the] freedom to select a
school of their choice ... ensure that a government [benefit] will
be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private
decision of individual parents." 5
The third prong of the Lemon Test requires the Court to
consider "the character and purpose of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of aid that by the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority.""' 6 The Court is concerned with "programs, whose
very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administra-
tion .... Statutes which require the state to monitor the ac-
tivities of a sectarian school to ensure adherence to the secular
purpose of the law create "excessive and enduring entanglement
between state and church" and are "fraught with the sort of en-
tanglement that the Constitution forbids.""8
provide assistance to private schools, the great majority of which are sectarian." Id.
at 783. Finally, under the Courts analysis of the tax credit provisions it noted the
credit was only available to parents who send their children to private schools and
not available to "all" parents thus viewing the credit as "advancing" religion.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793-94.
'1 See supra note .11 (noting Court's view on indirect and direct funding).
"3 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788.
1 See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993)
(holding that Establishment Clause does not prevent state from providing sign lan-
guage interpreter to accompany deaf student at Roman Catholic high school). The
Court viewed the government program as providing neutral benefits to a broad class
of citizens defined without reference to religion. Id. at 2469. Additionally, the pro-
gram distributes benefits after the parents independently select the school of their
choice for their disabled children. Id.
... Id. at 2467.
6 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
"1 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
". Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20.
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It is suggested that a properly designed, fully participating
school voucher program should withstand a challenge under the
Establishment Clause. The once rigid case law has evolved to
allow a "neutral" state benefit, neither advancing nor inhibiting
religion, to flow "indirectly" to sectarian schools.'19 The Supreme
Court is concerned with state actions that appear to promote or
inhibit religion.'2 A school voucher program that provides for
the random selection of participants from all school children and
enables their parents to select a school of their choice would be
viewed as a neutral state benefit. A properly drafted voucher
program "ensures" that state money will be present in a sectar-
ian school only after "the private decision of individual par-
ents."12' The state money, under a publicly funded school
voucher program has an equal chance of remaining in the local
public school or being applied to the tuition at a private school. 22
19 See, e.g., Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (allowing state employed sign language in-
terpreter to accompany deaf student attending Catholic high school); Whitters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (allowing state finance
of blind student's training at Christian college under state vocational program);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (permitting tax deductions for school expenses
for all parents of school children). But see Aquilar v. Fenton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(prohibiting state from using federal funds to pay salaries of public school employees
who teach in religious schools); Wohnan v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding
state's provision of bus transportation for religions school field trips unconstitu-
tional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (prohibiting state from providing re-
medial teaching and counseling services on religious school grounds).
'
2
" See supra note 114; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting
secondary schools from starting graduation ceremonies with invocation delivered by
clergy person, noting that "degree of school involvement here made it clear that the
graduation prayers bore the imprint of the state and thus put school-age children
who objected in an untenable position."); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (holding government display of creche unconstitutional because it appears to
indicate government's advancement of religion).
'' See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct.at 2467; see also 1995 Wis. Legis Serv. 27, §§ 4004,
4006m (West) (providing details of voucher program which provides that "[t]he pupil
or the pupil's parent or guardian shall submit an application ... to the participating
private school that the pupil wishes to attend..." and "[ulpon receipt from the pupil's
parent or guardian of proof of the pupil's enrollment in the private school, the state
superintendent shall pay to the parent or guardian ... an amount equal to the total
amount [available under the program] ... .") (emphasis added); CLINT BOLICK &
RICHARD D. KOMER, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, School Choice: Answers to the Most
Frequently Asked Legal Questions, (1995). One feature required of school voucher
program to survive First Amendment challenge is "[tihe decision of which school to
choose is made by parents or students, not the state." Id. at 4. The funds must be
"transmitted from the state to religiously affiliated schools only through the inde-
pendent decisions of third parties." Id.
'2 See supra note 121 (supporting theory that, in order to pass constitutional
muster, voucher program must provide parents and students with choice between
2971996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:273
The decision rests in the parents' hands to make the choice;
voucher programs simply provide the opportunity for that choice.
A voucher program which indirectly funds a sectarian school
must not create "excessive and enduring entanglements between
state and church" in order to satisfy the third prong of the
Lemon Test.123 Private, sectarian, and non-sectarian schools are
already subject to some state and federal education regula-
tions.'24 A private religious school, by accepting vouchers, should
not become subject to any additional state supervision or regula-
tion. 1
25
The Court's inconsistency in applying the Lemon Test has
often been criticized. 126  Supreme Court dicta has reflected the
public and private schools). The Supreme Court has allowed benefits that were
available for use in either private or public school, as long they were directed to the
school after the private decision of the parent, viewing the benefits as neutral in
their effect. See, e.g., Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. 2462; Whitters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). The Court, however, has disallowed a tax
deduction that was made available only to parents sending their children to private
schools, viewing the benefit as providing an incentive to choose private schools.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). It is
suggested that school voucher programs that direct money to either private or pub-
lic schools after the private decision of parents would be viewed by the courts as an
allowable neutral state benefit. It would not create an incentive for parents to send
their children to private schools thereby leaving the private or public school with no
state created advantage in receiving the money. "Parents would seek that school
that best met their own concerns with respect to the education of their children."
Levin, supra note 19, at 256. "A voucher plan would relegate the production of edu-
cation to a marketplace in which both public and private schools would compete for
students." Id.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 807 (McKinney 1994) (mandating that all schools
instruct and train students on fire drill procedure); 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(4) (1995)
(ensuring that all schools comply with regulation regarding education of handi-
capped children).
r2 See BOLICK & KOMER, supra note 121, at 7 (stating that provision of public
funds does not invariably subject private schools to extensive government regula-
tion). "Even absent public funds, the state permissibly may regulate private
schools." Id. School voucher programs can vary in several key aspects, one of which
is the extent of state regulation of participating schools. See HENIG, supra note 68,
at 175-78 (discussing various government regulation of education). It should be
noted, however, that "[tihe ultimate safeguard is the freedom of private schools to
refuse to participate in choice programs if they deem restrictions too onerous."
BOLICK & KOMER, supra note 122, at 7.
16 See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as a Liberal: The Religion
Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 151 (1987) (indicating that Lemon test is criticized due to vague language,
inconsistent results, and test's lack of validity); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update., 75 CAL. L. REV. 5-6 (1987)
(noting inconsistencies in decisions after Lemon "have produced a conceptual disas-
SCHOOL CHOICE
view that the Lemon Test may be in need of revision. 7 In a con-
curring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 8 Justice O'Connor enunci-
ated a revision to the Lemon Test which has since been labeled
the "Endorsement Test." 9 Under this test, the government can
violate the Establishment Clause in two ways. The first viola-
tion occurs when the government becomes "excessively entan-
gled" with religious institutions."' Justice O'Connor indicated
that an excessive entanglement could result in some religious
groups gaining access to government services which are not
available to everyone. 3' Moreover, excessive entanglement could
lead to the creation of political constituencies based upon relig-
ious agendas."2 The second violation results when government
appears to either endorse or disapprove of religion."' Justice
O'Connor explained that one of the purposes of the Establish-
ter area"); Evan M. Tager, The Supreme Court, Effect Inquiry, and Aid to Parochial
Education, 37 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1984) (arguing that second prong of Lemon Test is
inadequate and should be reexamined); Paul J. Weishaar, School Choice Vouchers
and The Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV. 543 (1994) (noting that third prong
of Lemon Test has been criticized for not providing adequate guidance); DeGaetano,
supra note 96, at 947 (noting that Lemon Test "has been the subject of much criti-
cism since the Supreme Court enunciated it....").
See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2149-50 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (launching his most recent attack on Lemon,
stating "[The test is like] some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and schuffles along, after being repeatedly killed and buried ...
No fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, per-
sonally driven pencils through the creature's heart ... ."); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting extensive criti-
cism of Lemon test and arguing to use it as "signpost" rather than comprehensive
test); Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(advocating abandonment of Lemon Test because it is based on improper reading of
history); id. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that Lemon Test exists only to
provide signposts for courts and does not provide bright-line approach); id. at 69-70
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (calling for refinement of Lemon test to make it more
helpful in achieving underlying purpose of religion clauses); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465




8 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
' Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (labelling
her analysis "Endorsement Test" because it examines whether government's pur-
pose is to endorse religion and whether statute conveys message of endorsement).
"' Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 688 (citing Larkin v. Grendels Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding
statute, which gave governing body of church power to deny liquor licenses to its
neighbors, violated Establishment Clause)).
m Id.
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ment Clause is to avoid political divisions along religious lines."M
Furthermore, the "Endorsement Test" can serve to clarify
analysis made under the second prong of the Lemon Test be-
cause it focuses on the "institutional entanglement" and
"endorsement or disapproval of religion."135  It appears Justice
O'Connor's primary objective in religious school aid cases is the
prevention of government programs that could inadvertently
bring any form of religion into the school room.1
36
Application of the "Endorsement Test" to a fully participat-
ing school voucher program would not prove fatal. The govern-
ment would be no more entangled with the religious institution
accepting school vouchers than it is currently involved with relig-
ious schools. 37 Moreover, it is the parents, not the government,
who endorse or disapprove of the religious school when they ex-
ercise their choice.'38 The government would simply be providing
parents with the ability to make that choice freely.19
Based upon the recent trend in Supreme Court decisions, it
seems that school voucher programs will be evaluated under a
'3 Id. at 689.
131 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the "Endorsement
Test" modification would prevent invalidation of some laws that the Court has up-
held even though they may advance or inhibit religion, such as tax exemptions for
religious organizations. Id. at 691-92. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
694 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for religious, educational, and chari-
table organizations); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (sanctioning law giving
public school students released time for religious instruction).
... See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398-400 (1985). Jus-
tice O'Connor distinguished between a parochial school teacher paid by the state
and a public school teacher who taught parochial school students, viewing only the
former as an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 399-400.
Justice O'Connor indicated that parochial school teachers being paid by the state
had the perceived and actual effect of advancing religion. Id. at 400.
137 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (citing instances of govern-
ment involvement in school affairs under school voucher programs).
8 See supra note 121 (indicating choice of school stems from parents' private,
independent decision). Justice O'Connor applied an "objective observer" standard
when determining if the religious activity in question would be viewed as govern-
ment endorsed. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("[wihether an objective observer acquainted with the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement."). Ap-
plying this to school voucher programs, the question becomes whether an "objective
observer" would conclude that the state was endorsing religion by providing parents
with the opportunity to make a private, independent decision as to whether their
child[ren] attend a sectarian, non sectarian, or public school. It is submitted that an
objective observer would not.




more modern doctrine. The new doctrine appears to provide
school voucher programs with a roadway through the Establish-
ment Clause.
III. How SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAMS CAN FOSTER PUBLIC
SCHOOL REFORM
Proponents of school voucher programs assert that empower-
ing parents with the freedom to choose their children's schools
will create competition among schools.4 °  Currently, public
school systems have a quasi-monopoly and a captive consumer.'
Parents, particularly in low-income families, have little or no
choice as to where they can send their children to school.' The
'4' See supra note 72 (noting competitive market theory underlying school
voucher programs); see also Bright, supra note 61, at 199 (noting proponents of Cali-
fornia's school voucher program claimed program would increase quality of educa-
tion by creating competition among schools thereby forcing schools to "stream-line
wasteful bureaucracy and inefficient practices in order to attain greater academic
achievement out of each dollar spent."); Richard Delgado, The Critique of Normativ-
ity: Norms and Normal Science: Toward A Critique of Normativity in Legal
Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 939 (1991) (noting that giving parents choice of
schools will create competition among those schools for students, forcing upgrade in
quality of instruction); Green, supra note 95, at 37-38 ("The gist of [school voucher
programs] is that enabling parents to choose between sending their children to pub-
lic schools or their private counterparts will increase parental involvement in edu-
cation and make public schools more responsive and more innovative as they com-
pete for scarce resources and the best students."); Moss, supra note 72 ("Without
competition that would spur correction of deficiencies, the system does little or
nothing to improve teaching techniques, allow more creativity in the classroom and
recognize the individuality of the children.").
14 See Paul E. Peterson, Monopoly and Competition in American Education, in
CHOICE AND CONTROL, supra note 19, at 47 (noting that public schools squeeze out
potential competitors through their quasi-monopoly of education). "The quasi-
monopoly in public education is today so pervasive a fact of American life that its
existence is pretty much taken for granted." Id. at 51; see also James A. Peyser, Is-
sues in Education Law and Policy: School Choice: When, Not If, 35 B.C. L. REV. 619,
621 (1994) (stating that public education establishment has vested interest in status
quo, has virtual monopoly on elementary and secondary education, and, like all mo-
nopolists, want to protect its franchise); Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit
Corporations in Revitalizing Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U.
TOLEDO L. REV. 883 (1993) (noting that American public schools have a near-
monopoly-no performance standards and little competition either from within edu-
cation system or from outside); Debenport, supra note 70, at El (quoting Tim
Sheehy, President of Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce, as stating
that there is need to "break the monopoly" in public schools as to create competition
and stimulate reform); Sielaff, supra note 83 ("The public school system displays all
the typical symptoms associated with tax-funded organizations guaranteed a captive
clientele-waste, rigidity and low productivity.").
'4 See, e.g., Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of Sectarian Education: Estab-
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local public school system, regardless of the quality of education
provided, is nearly guaranteed the attendance of school-aged
children in the community." Public school administrators have
no market incentive to better the quality of their educational
programs.'" The administrators know that regardless of the test
scores or graduation rates achieved by the student body, local
children will likely have no option but to enroll. "' Additionally,
lishment and Free Exercise Clause Implications, 2 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 7 (1993)
(noting that options in schooling are frequently beyond means of low-income fami-
lies, whereas wealthier families can either relocate to areas offering superior
schooling or send children to private schools); Romel Hernandez & Christopher
Broderick, Children Get Left Behind, A Struggling Education System Threatens to
Unravel the City's Cultural and Economic Renaissance, ROCKY MOUNT. NEWS, Apr.
23, 1995, at 24A (quoting Denver school board member, "I see a district where the
poor probably have no choice but Denver Public Schools ... Others will have choices
.... "); Buttress, supra note 72, at B1 (stating that income levels of most citizens
limit their options in schooling to public schools); see also Mark Skertic, Cincinnati
Schools, CINN. ENQUIRER, Aug. 27, 1995, at Al (noting that 51% of Cincinnati public
school students come from families earning less than $20,000 annually, 45% of stu-
dents come from families earning between $20,000 and $74,999, and only 4% of stu-
dents come from families earning over $75,000).
'4 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28-3 (1995) (requiring all children between ages 7-
16 to attend school); CAL. EDUC. CODE chap. 2 (West 1995) (defining state compul-
sory education law); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1561 (West 1993) (requiring all
children ages 6-16 to attend school); see also Peyser, supra note 141, at 622 n.13
(indicating that 87% of all elementary and secondary school students in United
States are enrolled in public schools); Billy House, School Enrollments to Swell,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 6, 1995 (Albany) (noting that 85% of New York
State's school-age students attend public schools); Valerie Strauss, The Pull of Pri-
vate School; Area Enrollment Exceeds National Average, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1995
at Al (stating that only 11% of all students in United States attend private schools).
The combined effect of compulsory education laws and statistics, indicating that at
least 85% of all school-age children attend public school, illustrates that public
schools are essentially "guaranteed" students.
'4 See, e.g., HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND
THE CITIES 30 (1972) ("[Blecause the demand for education is relatively inelastic,
teachers rarely need fear unemployment ... the threat of an important nonunion ri-
val (competitive private schools) is not to be taken seriously so long as potential cus-
tomers of private education must pay taxes to support the public school system.");
Levin, supra note 19, at 255 ("If the state paid all of the costs [of education], the
teacher '... would soon learn to neglect his business.'") (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edward Carman, ed., 1937) (1776)); Moss, supra note 72
(claiming that absence of market incentives leaves school administrators, principals,
and teachers free to underachieve); Sielaff, supra note 83 (criticizing monopoly held
by public schools because it "relieves educrats of accountability"). "If schools are not
subject to economic discipline by patrons free to reject their products 'they will not
succeed either as places of learning or as human communities.'" Id. (quoting John E.
Coons, Comments on the Law on Education of the Russian Federation (1993)).
4 See supra notes 142-43 (indicating that public schools are many students'
only choice in education); see also 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 592 (transcribing
President Reagan's remarks after receiving education commission report on condi-
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the administrators are also aware that the per-pupil state fund-
ing will continue and is not tied to school performance.14
The lack of competition is one of the leading causes of the
decline of the American public school system. For example,
imagine if American business could rely on a guaranteed cus-
tomer base with a guaranteed cash flow. In a competitive mar-
ket, the fear of losing customers and the associated cash flow is a
very real concern. Corporations continually evaluate their
product line, productivity, customer service satisfaction, and cor-
porate efficiency in order to remain competitive and viable. 48
Similarly, a public school system required to compete with other
education providers in the community would be forced to become
more efficient, provide a better product, and improve services in
order to remain viable.
School vouchers will give poor and working-class parents the
opportunity to send their children to the school which they be-
lieve will provide the best possible education.'49 Wealthier par-
tion of nation's public education system). "Despite record levels of educational
spending, America's students came in last in 7 of 19 academic tests compared to
students of other industrialized nations." Id.; David Poppe, Turning Point: The Com-
ing Revolution in Florida Education, FLA. TREND, Sept. 1995, at 30 (claiming that
many large public school districts in Florida have created schools that can "seem
unresponsive to parents or students").
See, e.g., Sielaff supra note 83 (noting that poor test results qualify schools
for additional funding). Furthermore, education special interest groups have consis-
tently persuaded legislatures, school boards, and parents that what is good for them
is also good for the children. Id. Typically what these groups have lobbied for is
simply more money. Id.
141 See, e.g., Electricity Prices Will Decrease in Competitive Market Says Wiscon-
sin Electric in Final Comments to PSCW, PR NEWSWiEE, Dec. 4, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File ("In a competitive market, low-cost suppliers that
consider raising prices risk losing customers to competitors lowering prices to at-
tract more business."); Thomas 0. Jones & W. Earl Sasser, Why Satisfied Customers
Defect, HARV. BUS. R., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 88 (claiming that except in "few rare in-
stances, complete customer satisfaction is the key to securing customer loyalty and
generating superior long-term financial performance" and that "[miost managers
realize the more competitive the market, the more important the level of customer
satisfaction").
. See, e.g., GM Reports Record Net Income of $2.3 Billion for Second Quarter of
1995, CANADA NEWSWIRE, July 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires
File (indicating auto industry recognizes that they must maintain their focus, con-
tinually improve quality of their products, and maintain customer satisfaction in
competitive auto market); Fiat Group: 1994 Six Months Results, PR NEWSWIRE,
Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (noting that Fiat
Group recognizes that innovation, efficiency, and high quality products and services
will be crucial factors in determining success in increasingly competitive market).
19 See supra note 142 (noting lack of educational choice for low-income fami-
lies); Areen & Jencks, supra note 22, at 50-51 (indicating that average parent has no
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ents have the financial capability to bypass public schools, when
appropriate, and send their children to their school of choice.15 °
A voucher system would give all parents the same power of
choice. 5 ' Wisconsin state representative Annette Williams
stated: "The state is directly helping families who have drive,
who have high expectations, but who don't have money, to vote
with their feet."'52 This empowerment of low-income families
should motivate the public schools to respond and reform or risk
losing their student population to another school, public or pri-
vate, that is operating efficiently and effectively.'53
The original GI Bill, which provided for college tuition pay-
ments based on active duty service, was a government sponsored
education voucher program."5 Under the GI Bill, established in
1944, military veterans were able to attend the college or uni-
versity of their choice-public or private, sectarian or non-
sectarian-and the tuition costs were either offset or covered in
full through a voucher payment sent directly to the selected
choice except to send children to public schools, but with vouchers, parents can
choose best school rather than closest school); Daniel, supra note 94, at 27
(indicating that vouchers will empower parents to choose schools of highest quality
for their children); Green, supra note 21, at 38 (noting choice advocates argue choice
will "empower parents-especially those on the lower-economic level-to obtain a
better education for their children than is afforded through the public education
system"); Deborah Ramirez, SYMPOSIUM: RACE AND REMEDY IN A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY: Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47
STAN. L. REv. 957, 986 (1995) (noting that school choice programs can "empower
low-income parents of all races and ethnicities to define their children's educational
needs").
15o See supra note 23 (noting wealthier parents have choices in education not
available to low-income families).
1 See Justin J. Sayfie, Comment, Education Emancipation for Inner City Stu-
dents: A New Legal Paradigm for Achieving Equality of Educational Opportunity, 48
U. MIAMI L. REV. 913, 939 (1994) ("A voucher remedy can do what no other remedy
... can do; it gives the poor and the less fortunate more control and power over the
decisions that affect their lives."). Higher income families "can either leave a school
they regard as unfit by moving to another district, or they can pay tuition at a pri-
vate school. Families dissatisfied with a legally inadequate school who do not have
these resources have no options-they are bonded to substandard schools." Id. at
939-40 (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 23 and 142 (noting lack of educa-
tional choices available for low-income families).
152 SPRING, supra note 21, at 163-64 (quoting Annette Williams).
153 See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 21, at 226 (1990) (indicating availability of pa-
rental choice will force schools of inferior quality to either provide better service or
cease to exist).
"' See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284,
288 (1944) ("[A qualifying veteran] shall be eligible for and entitled to such course of
education or training as he may elect, and at any approved educational or training
institution at which he chooses to enroll ....").
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school.55 The constitutionality of the tuition voucher component
of the GI Bill has never been challenged.5 6 In fact, the flourish-
ing of the American university system has been credited to the
GI Bill.'57 Moreover, it has never been accused of causing the
decline of public universities or causing segregation.
Over forty years later, President George Bush proposed the
"GI Bill for Children," but it failed to receive the approval of
Congress."' The primary reason for the different outcome of the
"'s See id. at 289 (providing payment should be made directly to education or
training facility); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 603 (D.S.C. 1974)
(noting original GI Bill "provided for direct payment to schools and other vendors of
supplies and services for books, tuition and other educational expenses"), affd, 529
F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975); HENIG, supra note 68, at 92 (noting original GI Bill did not
limit schools veterans could attend). The GI Bill has undergone many revisions
since its original version was adopted in 1944. See, e.g., R. Lamont Jones, Jr., GI
Bill Changed the Face of U.S. Education, PITTS. POST- GAZZETTE, June 22, 1994, at
Al (noting that original bill ended in 1956 and supplying history of revisions leading
up to current Montgomery GI Bill). The current program provides for payment to be
made to the eligible serviceman directly. 38 U.S.C. § 3014 (1994). Additionally, the
new program limits the amount of benefits to $400 per month. 38 U.S.C. § 3015
(1994).
" See Whitters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486
n.3 (1986) (describing structure of GI Bill as "'hands off aid"). Although the disper-
sion of fimds to a sectarian institution for a veteran's education has not been chal-
lenged, the Supreme Court has ruled that the GI Bill's disallowance of benefits to a
conscientious objector who performed two years of alternative civilian service was
not an interference "with his free exercise of religion by increasing the price he must
pay for adherence to his religious beliefs." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383
(1974).
.. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 155, at Al (noting GI Bill caused "skyrocketing"
enrollment in American universities and colleges and quoting Penn State professor
Roger L. Geiger as stating, "[b]y 1948, the Veterans Administration was paying 56
percent of student fees in private universities and 67 percent in public ones"); Rich-
ard J. Maloy, A Law That Changed America; The GI Bill Was a Lucky Accident,
WASH. POST, June 24, 1994, at A27 (crediting GI Bill for transforming U.S. into
"knowledge society" where "college education became commonplace"); Donald W.
Patterso, GI Bill Gave Many a New Start; Enacted 50 Years Ago, NEWS & RECORD,
(GREENSBORO, N.C.) June 22, 1994, at Al (indicating that "[e]xperts say the GI Bill
shifted America from an industrial society to knowledge society and in process cre-
ated economic and educational revolution").
3 See H.R. 5664, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 3010, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992). The legislation proposed the "Federal Grants for State and Local 'GI Bills'
for Children." H.R. 5664, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The purpose of the Act was to
give "children from middle- and low-income families more of the same choices of all
elementary and secondary schools and other academic programs that children from
wealthier families already have." Id. at § 2. The goal of the Act was to improve
schools by giving middle- and low-income parents the power of choice. Id. The value
of each "scholarship" was $1000 and could be used at any participating school, sec-
tarian or nonsectarian. Id. §§ 5-6.
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two programs was the effect of special interest groups. No group
lobbied against the GI Bill; the GI Bill for Children, however,
was vehemently opposed by the NEA.6 9 If the tuition assistance
portion of the GI Bill is both constitutional and effective, it
should logically follow that a school voucher program at the state
level would also be constitutional and effective.
The biggest myth created by the public school system is that
more money means better education.6 ' The Kansas City Public
School System illustrates the fallacy of this concept. 6' The Kan-
"9 See, e.g., Carol Innerst, Alexander Rips NEA's Effort to 'Control' Schools,
WASH. TIMES, July 7, 1992, at A3 (noting NEA opposed voucher plans consistently
since 1970 and "GI Bill for Children" will be no different); Martin Kasindorf, Dems'
Road Not Taken; Bush Woos Catholic Vote, Touts Tuition-Grant Plan, NEWSDAY,
July 22, 1992, at 14 (New York City ed.) (indicating strong opposition by NEA for
"GI Bill for Children"); Frank J. Murray, Bush Assails Union Over School Choice,
WASH. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at A4 (quoting President Bush as saying "Many that
control the establishment in Washington are in the grips of a very powerful union,
the NEA, and ... it seems to be an arm of the opposition party."); see also David A.
Vise, Senate Rejects Tuition Vouchers, Keeping D.C. Budget in Limbo, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 1996, at Al (noting NEA's influence in defeating voucher legislation).
16o See, e.g., Samuel R. Staley, Public School Failings Shouldn't Be Blamed on
Inadequate Spending, PERSP., June 15, 1995 (published by The Buckeye Institute
for Public Policy Solutions) (noting that critics' attempts to blame Ohio public school
decline on insufficient funding is erroneous because state's district with highest per-
pupil spending had "lowest pupil attendance rates, highest drop out rates, and low-
est graduation rates"); Marjorie Davies, Spending and Student Achievement in Ohio
Public Schools: Providing Incentives For Efficiency, REGIONAL POLY REP. No. 2,
BUCKEYE INST. FOR PUBLIC POLICY SOLUTIONS, Apr. 30, 1991, at ii ("[Sipending on
public education in Ohio is negatively correlated with student achievement. That is,
lower spending districts tend to have higher student achievement ... .") (emphasis
omitted); Sielaff, supra note 83 (noting that preponderance of educational research
has failed to show a connection between more money and improved achievement);
School Choice; Parents Deserve the Freedom to Pick Best Schools for Kids, CINN.
ENQUIRER, Mar. 5, 1995, at H2 ("[Tihose who attended good public schools a gen-
eration ago must face sobering facts: Despite two decades and billions of dollars
spent on reforms, most public schools are not delivering results to match insatiable
spending.").
161 In the wake of a landmark 1985 federal court school desegregation order, the
Kansas City Public School system implemented a 10 year plan to overhaul the pub-
lic school system. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affid,
807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). In further litigation
over the desegregation order, the court ordered a property tax increase to help fund
the project. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 413 (W.D. Mo. 1987). The
Governor of Missouri considered the court ordered tax increase to have created
"additional funds for additional educational frills, the court has created a bureau-
cratic nightmare." Toni Cardarella, Ashcroft Blasts KC Desegregation Ruling, UPI,
Sept. 22, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; see infra notes 162-63
(indicating how much money was spent, what it was spent on and current status of
Kansas City Public Schools).
SCHOOL CHOICE
sas City Public School System received over one billion dollars to
fund programs designed to enhance the quality of education.162
The money was used to improve existing schools, develop magnet
schools, and purchase state-of-the-art computer systems for the
schools.'63 After ten years, the school system's test scores and
graduation rates have shown little or no improvement."M Kansas
City's experience is not unique.'65 Many public school budgets
have steadily increased, yet student achievement has remained
steady or has declined.'66 With the average per-pupil cost exceed-
ing $5,700 for elementary and secondary schools, it seems star-
tling that the public school system cannot perform better.'67 The
12 See Retha Hill, School Desegregation Effort Shows High Cost of Change; Mis-
souri Model Offers Lessons for P.G., WASH. POST, Jan. 9. 1995, at Al (indicating cost
of $1.3 billion over last decade).
" See, e.g., Cardarella, supra note 161 (indicating that Governor viewed district
plans, which included building of heated log cabin with toilets and capacity for 26
persons, 25 acre working farm, and air conditioned meeting room, as plans which
"simply do not reflect the needs of quality education"); Stephen Chapman, The Kan-
sas City Plan Is a Decisive Failure, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 1993, at 7B
(noting additions including purchase of $250,000 planetarium); Hill, supra note 162,
at Al (indicating implementation of magnet schools and purchasing of 9,000 com-
puters as part of court ordered reform in Kansas City). As part of the rebuilding, the
district spent $32 million on creating the "sports and computer" magnet school
which has computers for almost every student, an Olympic size pool and indoor
track. Id.
" See, e.g., Hill, supra note 162, at Al (noting Kansas City's spending program
produced slight gains in student achievement); Lynn Horsley, Scores Would Be a
Test for Murphy; KC Students Still Do Well in Early Grades but then Fall Below Na-
tional Average, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 19, 1995, at Al (noting scores of students
grades 1-3 were above national average, but older grades' scores remain below aver-
age); Jacob H. Wolf, Desegregation Payments Hit $1 Billion, UPI, Oct. 4, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting Missouri State Treasurer
Wendell Bailey as saying "[tihere has been no marked improvement in [Kansas
City] test scores notwithstanding per-pupil expenditures which are nearly double
statewide levels"); Mary Jo Draper, Kansas City Fights Staggering School Drop Out
Rate, Natl Pub. Radio, July 6, 1995) (reporting that only 1,100 of more than 2,500
students who began ninth grade in 1990 graduated from Kansas City high schools).
1" See Neil MacFarquhar, Education Chief in Trenton Asks Legislature to Set
School Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at Al (reporting that according to New
Jersey Commissioner of Education, Dr. Leo F. Klagholz, "New Jersey spends $12
Billion a year on education-more per pupil than any other state-but ... spending
[is] not reflected in overall student achievement"); Spending Per Pupil and National
Testing: More Money Does Not Mean Better Scores, Bus./EDUC. INSIDER, May 1992,
at 3 (providing chart showing that states with below average spending rank high in
test scores).
'e See supra note 5 (indicating increasing school budgets and falling perform-
ance).
'6 See Average Per Pupil Expenditures up 25% From 1988-89, EDUC. MAR-
KETER, Jan. 2, 1995 (noting national average reached $5,726 in 1993-94 school year,
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fact that forty-eight percent of the money received covers admin-
istrative costs and only fifty-two percent of it reaches the class-
room is not only insulting but also provides an explanation as to
why the system fails to do better.'68 Critics of the voucher sys-
tem claim that it will drain money away from public schools,
thereby causing them to become a wasteland. 9 To the contrary,
it is suggested that vouchers will not only force public schools to
manage their budgets more efficiently, but also will provide the
necessary incentives to improve the quality of their educational
programs.
American business executives have given the public school
system a "C-" grade. ° "Business' general dismay with the public
schools has been aggravated by the staggering and increasing
New Jersey spending $10,062 (highest) and Utah spending $3,419 (lowest)); see also
supra note 160 (dispelling myth that more money spent in education produces bet-
ter education). In 1994, the five North Carolina counties with the highest per pupil
expenditures (mean of $6,327) produced mean proficiency scores of 59.7% for read-
ing and 58.9% for mathematics. See Cline, supra note 4, at 73. In contrast, the five
lowest spending counties (mean of $4,046) produced proficiency scores of 69.2% for
reading and 68.2 % for math. Id. Additionally, despite the levels of spending in pub-
lic schools, a recently released National Adult Literacy Survey "revealed that 90
million American adults, almost half the population, possess, at best, the most ru-
dimentary reading and math skills." See Sielaff, supra note 83. "Forty to 44 million
couldn't locate a single piece of information in a written passage if doing so required
making an inference from the text or any background information." Id. "Another 50
million adults couldn't calculate the total cost of a purchase, determine the differ-
ence in price between two items, locate an intersection on a street map or enter in-
formation on a simple form." Id.
1"8 See Michael J. Mandel et al., Will Schools ever Get Better?, Bus. WEEK, Apr.
17, 1995, at 64 (noting that according to Bruce Cooper of Fordham University,
"[olly 52% of every school dollar actually gets into the classroom in a typical large
school district"). In 1994, New York City spent almost $8,000 per pupil and only $44
dollars was budgeted for classroom materials. Id. In Nashville, public schools dis-
covered "they were spending 24% of their budget on operations such as mainte-
nance, compared with 18% for a typical large school district." Id.
.. See, e.g., Merl, supra note 68, at A3 (indicating critics say voucher system
would destroy public schools due to voucher's effect of siphoning funds from public
schools); Ed Rauchut, School Vouchers Gain Momentum, OMAHA WORLD HERALD,
Oct. 29, 1995, at 13B (arguing against critics' claim that vouchers will divert money
from public schools thereby hurting them); Stephens, supra note 67, at 4E (noting
opponents of school vouchers claim "vouchers will divert much-needed money from
public school districts that are already struggling").
170 See Allen & McLaughlin, supra note 12 (citation omitted); see also Speaker's
Corner, HERITAGE FOUND., Oct. 1990, at 2 (noting that survey by Conference Board,
New York-based business group, found that "nearly one in five companies ha[d]
problems finding people who can read well enough to qualify for entry-level jobs"




cost of employee training, much of it remedial in nature.""' This
is not surprising when one understands that the public school
system graduates 700,000 students a year who cannot even read
their own diplomas."' Corporate America views the rising cost of
employee training as a threat to the competitiveness of American
companies and, therefore, corporations are becoming involved
with the school reform movement.'73 They view vouchers as a vi-
able way to force schools to become accountable and to tackle the
managerial and structural design flaws that cause poor perform-
ance.
4
Critics claim that school vouchers will re-segregate the
school system because only non-minority families will be able to
take advantage of vouchers, thereby leaving minority children in
failing public schools.175  This argument is flawed for two rea-
,7' Allen & McLaughlin, supra note 12.
,r' See Ann M. Morrison, Saving our Schools, FORTUNE, Spring 1990, at 8; see
also The Record Thus Far, 1994 DER 26 d99, Feb. 9, 1994 (BNA) (noting that
"[ilewer than two in five students in grade 12 can move beyond surface understand-
ing of a text, make inferences or draw conclusions from what they have read").
'73 See supra note 12 (indicating corporate America's response to failing school
system). "Corporate America's reasons for investing in education are the improve-
ment of American competitiveness and the preservation of American democracy."
Morrison, supra note 172, at 8. "As global competition has increased, the quality of
American workers has declined. U.S. companies spend millions a year to teach em-
ployees to read-a cost Japanese competitors do not have to expend." Id.
' See Allen & McLaughlin, supra note 12. American corporations claim that
just as a failing industrial giant needs restructuring if it is to turn around, Ameri-
can public schools need fundamental reform. Id. "In Ohio and Minnesota, business
efforts were a pivotal force in creating broad public school choice programs for their
communities." Id.; see supra notes 80-85 (indicating tremendous corporate support
for privately funded school voucher programs and Milwaukee's parental choice pro-
gram); Cebula & Buckman, supra note 80, at El (indicating local bank president
viewed corporate cash grant to Catholic Schools was business' way of sending mes-
sage to public institutions that "the business community is going to fund the most
efficient, cost-beneficial program that's out there."); see also How Real is the Im-
provement of our Students in School?, Nat'l Pub. Radio, Sept. 11, 1995)
(interviewing former executive of Xerox, Frank Pipp, "[schools have] way too much
overhead, they're top heavy with management, ... their incentive systems are
counter-productive.").
'76 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 17, at 176 (noting opponents of school choice
"contend that freedom of choice would increase racial segregation among schools");
A. Phillips Brooks & Jeff South, School-choice Proposals Worry Resegregation Crit-
ics; Statistics Show Trend of Clustering of Minorities and Low-income Students,
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Apr. 9, 1995, at Al ("Critics worry that several educational
experiments the Legislature is considering in its overhaul of the Texas school sys-
tem would resegregate public schools and steal away their most promising stu-
dents."). Interestingly, research indicates that Texas schools are becoming more
segregated naturally every year due to community clustering of minorities. Id. But
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sons. First, it assumes that all minority children come from low-
income families. Second, it assumes the public school system
cannot reform and will continue to fail. If, however, a public
school system responded by reducing waste and increasing its
efficiency and productivity, contrary to the critics' argument, the
remaining students would receive an education comparable to
their private school counterparts.'76 Furthermore, the claimed
flight of non-minorities would not occur. There would be no need
for parents to remove their children because the quality of edu-
cation would be as good or better than the private schools' qual-
ity of education.
Re-segregation arguments are specious, especially in light of
the structure of the current voucher programs and proposals.
Wisconsin's choice program provides tuition vouchers to low-
income families, the majority of which are minorities, thereby
providing minority families with a choice they previously did not
have.'77 The federal proposal also provides choice for low-income
families.'78 In fact, the amount of the voucher under the federal
program could be substantially higher than Wisconsin's program
and, thus could provide a greater choice for low-income fami-
lies.1
79
Supporters of school vouchers do not want the public school
system to fail, nor are they giving up on the public schools.80
see HENIG, supra note 68, at 101-16 (arguing that choice will not segregate but will
maintain integration in schools); COOKSON, supra note 1, at 94-95 (citing report
which indicated choice schools were somewhat more integrated than assigned
schools and private schools, and that there is little indication of "devastating
creaming effect on either the private schools or the local public schools").
6 See Vise, supra note 159 (quoting U.S. Senator Joseph I. Lieberman that
"[w]e have nothing to fear from [church-run schools] and a lot to learn from their
sense of purpose and dedication").
177 See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text (describing Wisconsin's school
choice program).
178 See H.R. 1640, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-3 (1995) (titling act as "Low-
income School Choice Demonstration Act of 1995"). The purpose of the Act "is to de-
termine the effects on students and schools of providing financial assistance to low-
income parents to enable such parents to select the public or private schools their
children will attend." Id. at § 2. An "eligible child" is defined as any "child in grades
1 through 12 who is eligible for free or reduced price lunches under the National
School Lunch Act." Id. § 3.
179 See H.R. 1640, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1995) (calling for voucher amount
to provide maximum degree of choice but limits maximum amount to the per-pupil
expenditure for schooling by local agency); supra note 167 (indicating national per
pupil expenditures average approximately $5,700).
1"0 See Moss, supra note 72 (quoting critic of public school system and supporter
of vouchers, as stating "[t]he objective here is not to move kids out of public schools
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Vouchers will provide parents of public school children with a
choice in education when they determine the public school can-
not get the job done. Why should students and parents be forced
to remain in an ineffective and failing school? They should not
have to remain there; vouchers would empower the parents with
the ability to make a choice. Likewise, vouchers would give the
public school system a choice-compete by becoming more effi-
cient and productive or resist and risk losing students and
funding.
CONCLUSION
In the midst of the national fury over school reform, school
voucher programs have grown in popularity and are becoming
the preferred approach to improve public schools. The Supreme
Court has provided a narrow doorway through the Establish-
ment Clause which would allow a well constructed school
voucher proposal the chance to be implemented. The public's
outcry for the opportunity to attend better schools appears to
have been answered by Wisconsin and by individuals who fund
private school choice programs around the nation. Congress
should take notice and adopt laws making school vouchers avail-
able to all school-aged children. It appears that the Supreme
Court would find such legislation constitutional.
Jo Ann Bodemer
into private schools" but that "[t]he objective is to improve public schools."); Merl,
supra note 68, at A3 (quoting parent as stating "I don't think being in favor of
vouchers means being against public schools. I just want to have options.").
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